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Secret Conviction Programs 
Meghan J. Ryan* 
Abstract 
 
Judges and juries across the country are convicting criminal 
defendants based on secret evidence. Although defendants have 
sought access to the details of this evidence—the results of computer 
programs and their underlying algorithms and source  
codes—judges have generally denied their requests. Instead, judges 
have prioritized the business interests of the for-profit companies 
that developed these “conviction programs” and which could lose 
market share if the secret algorithms and source codes on which the 
programs are based were exposed. This decision has jeopardized 
criminal defendants’ constitutional rights. 
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I. Introduction 
Across the country, judges and juries are convicting 
defendants based on secret evidence. Prosecutors regularly present 
expert testimony on breathalyzer results, fingerprint matches, and 
DNA matches, but courts have generally not allowed defendants to 
scrutinize how the prosecutions’ testifying experts produced this 
evidence.1 In fact, these experts likely do not themselves know how 
the results of their tests were reached.2 That is because much of 
this complicated, “scientific” evidence is generated by computer 
programs—“conviction programs”—built on secret algorithms and 
source codes developed in many instances by for-profit companies.3 
These companies refuse to reveal their secret formulas because 
they understandably do not want copycat companies to purloin 
                                                                                                     
 1. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 2. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 3. See infra Part IV.C. 
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their market shares.4 While judges, lawyers, and jurors generally 
trust conviction programs’ results as rooted in science, in truth 
there are real questions about the accuracy of the results these 
programs produce.5 Because the programs’ underlying algorithms 
and source codes are held as company secrets, there is generally 
little opportunity to sufficiently test the validity of their outputs.6 
Even without access to the nuances of conviction programs, 
there is some evidence that these programs do not produce reliable 
evidence. In New York alone, thousands of convictions have been 
rooted in complex statistical analyses of DNA evidence that has 
since been seriously questioned.7 When a court recently granted 
limited access to the source code of a conviction program used in 
these cases, an independent data analyst found that the program, 
which purported to accurately assess the likelihood that a 
defendant’s DNA was found in a mixture of various individuals’ 
DNA, was deficient; it excluded several variables that would be 
important to reach an accurate conclusion on this point.8 This is 
incredibly troubling. In one case, when experts used competing 
conviction programs of complex statistical DNA analysis to assess 
the probability that a defendant was at the scene of the crime, each 
program produced a different result.9 One indicated a likely DNA 
match and thus likely presence at the scene, whereas the other 
indicated that a match was unlikely and thus it was improbable 
that the defendant was at the crime scene.10 
                                                                                                     
 4. See infra Part IV. 
 5. See infra Part IV.  
 6.  See infra Part IV. 
7. See Lauren Kirchner, Thousands of Criminal Cases in New York Relied 
on Disputed DNA Testing Techniques, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 4, 2017, 6:00 PM), 
https://perma.cc/7ZAZ-V4MQ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (“Over the past decade, 
the DNA laboratory in the office of New York City’s chief medical examiner 
emerged as a pioneer in analyzing the most complicated evidence from crime 
scenes. . . . Now these DNA analysis methods are under the microscope, with 
scientists questioning their validity.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 8.  Id.   
 9.  See Seth Augenstein, Subjective DNA Mixture Analysis, Used in 
Thousands of Cases, Blasted by WH Panel, FORENSIC MAG. (Sept. 8, 2016, 12:37 
PM), https://perma.cc/XZY3-ZAPB (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 10.  See id. (“TrueAllele found the various DNA mixtures at the crime scene 
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Some commentators have criticized criminal justice actors’ 
reliance on computer programs in setting bail and sentences, and 
in determining when to grant an offender parole.11 But 
commentators have not been as vocal about the dangers associated 
with police officers and prosecutors relying on computer programs 
as investigatory tools and, more troublingly, as evidence for 
conviction.12 Yet even more is at stake—a defendant’s liberty or 
even his life—where conviction programs are involved. This 
happens when, for example, juries convict defendants based on the 
results of breathalyzer tests, police officers and fingerprint 
examiners rely on automated fingerprint identification systems 
(AFISs), and DNA analysts depend on programs like TrueAllele or 
STRmix for DNA matches.13 In the context of assessing guilt, the 
accuracy of the programs on which the criminal justice system 
relies is critical. 
Within the criminal justice system, the primary methods of 
ensuring the accuracy of evidence are by assessing the “reliability” 
of the information to determine whether it is admissible at trial 
and through adversarial testing—in the crucible of 
cross-examination—at trial.14 Today, neither of these tools is truly 
available to criminal defendants inculpated by these programs 
aimed at conviction. Ordinarily, the algorithms and source codes 
on which these conviction tools are based are not made available 
to defendants.15 Instead, the businesses responsible for creating 
the complicated algorithms, and the source codes implementing 
                                                                                                     
could not place Hillary there, while the prosecution was relying on a STRmix 
interpretation of fingernail scrapings that indicated he was there.”). 
 11. See infra Part II; see also, e.g., Rebecca Wexler, When a Computer 
Program Keeps You in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/K368-
QG93 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (“Technological advancement is, in theory, a 
welcome development. But in practice, aspects of automation are making the 
justice system less fair for criminal defendants.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14.  Cf. Meghan J. Ryan, Escaping the Fingerprint Crisis: A Blueprint for 
Essential Research, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author) 
(“Beyond cross-examination, the defense often is unable to present its own 
evidence about the inaccuracies and unreliability of fingerprint evidence.”). 
 15. See infra Part IV.  
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them, are kept secret in the name of the producing companies’ 
business interests and based on the assumed accuracy of the 
programs.16 This prevents criminal defendants facing conviction 
by computer algorithm and source code from mounting potentially 
viable defenses based on these secrets.  
At least some level of transparency is necessary to probe the 
important questions tied up with using computer programs to 
convict criminal defendants. Without access to the details of the 
algorithms and source codes, actors within the criminal justice 
system cannot clearly discern the accuracy of these programs and 
the extent to which improper factors contribute to their outputs.17 
Simply trusting the creators of these programs cannot 
suffice — especially where the creators are for-profit businesses and 
especially where defendants’ liberties and lives are on the line.  
The persistence of questionable convictions based on 
purported “scientific” evidence stems from lawyers’ blind faith in 
science and, relatedly, courts’ refusal to allow investigation into 
the validity of these conviction programs.18 Generally, judges and 
lawyers do not seem to be exceptionally troubled by the secret 
nature of the evidence used to convict criminal defendants.19 As in 
other areas where evidence has been labeled as science-based, the 
criminal justice system has often given experts in this arena a free 
pass. Certainly, science has its allure. It can offer an objective 
approach to decisionmaking, and, when linked with the impressive 
power of computing, it can survey a broad array of data in a 
significantly more cost-effective and reliable way than humans 
alone can ordinarily accomplish.20 But those not familiar with 
                                                                                                     
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17.  See infra Part IV. 
 18.  See infra Part IV.C; see also NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND LAW PROCEEDINGS 7 (April 15–16, 1999), 
https://perma.cc/X46M-LV8Y (PDF) (“[L]awyers would like to see science, when it 
is used in the courtroom, if not infallible, at least mostly accurate, mostly 
immutable, and certain. That is the very factor that, in the legal mind, makes the 
evidence also ‘reliable.’”). 
 19.  But see infra Part III.B (discussing challenges to the admissibility of 
DNA evidence reached through analyses based on TrueAllele and STRmix 
computer programs). 
 20.  See Lance Whitney, Are Computers Already Smarter Than Humans?, 
TIME (Sept. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/DA9E-ZMXS (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) 
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these disciplines, including lawyers, often over-hype science and 
technology.21 These disciplines are not a panacea.22 Human error 
is often built into these fields, and the powers of science and 
technology have their limits.23 By venerating these disciplines, 
lawyers risk surrendering one of their most valuable assets: 
skepticism.   
More than of just general concern, the secrecy shrouding the 
algorithms and source codes leading to defendant convictions is of 
constitutional proportions.24 It strikes at the heart of a defendant’s 
due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to make a full 
defense.25 Without the necessary information about the evidence 
that is being used to convict him, a defendant is denied the 
opportunity to properly challenge this evidence.26 Further, the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right loses its 
meaning when the expert testifying to the results of a breathalyzer 
test, fingerprint match, or DNA analysis does not fully understand 
the nuances of how the conviction program computed the results 
used as evidence against the defendant.27 Because the police officer 
testifying about a breathalyzer result ordinarily is not familiar 
                                                                                                     
(“Computers can take in and process certain kinds of information much faster 
than we can. They can swirl that data around in their ‘brains,’ made of processors, 
and perform calculations to conjure multiple scenarios at superhuman speeds.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 21.  See infra Part IV.C; see also Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 724 (1992) (“Lawyers may seize upon a researcher’s first 
expression of concern, and give it much import, even as later developments fail to 
support the concern.”).  
 22.  Cf. Huber, supra note 21, at 739 (conceding that “the views of the 
establishment are sometimes wrong, in science and medicine as in law” and 
noting that “Galileo gained fame by challenging one orthodoxy but eventually 
became part of another: he refused to believe that the moon caused tides, or that 
planets moved in ellipses”).  
 23.  See id. at 724–29.  
 24. See infra Part V (explaining how withholding such relevant evidence 
from the defense raises serious due process and confrontation issues). 
 25. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (stating that the 
Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant the opportunity to make a complete 
defense at trial); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (“The right of 
an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair 
opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.”). 
 26. See infra Parts IV–V.  
 27. See infra Part V. 
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with the underlying algorithm and source code, for example, a full 
examination about the accuracy of the result is impossible.28 The 
officer will not be able to explain how the breathalyzer transformed 
the defendant’s breath into a 0.10 reading as a machine estimate 
of the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration.29 Similarly, even a 
DNA analyst on the stand will ordinarily lack sufficient knowledge 
about a computer program such as TrueAllele or STRmix so that 
defense counsel can effectively use cross-examination to fully probe 
the reliability of evidence produced by these programs.30 And a 
fingerprint examiner lacks the necessary expertise of the 
underlying algorithms and source codes of AFISs to be able to 
competently testify about how they generate suspect fingerprints 
for analysis and, ultimately, conviction. With insufficient expertise 
on the conviction programs producing the results introduced at 
trial, defense counsel’s opportunity to cross-examine these experts 
is insufficient to meet the demands of the Sixth Amendment right 
to confront witnesses against the defendant.31 Finally, the secrecy 
shielding all of this evidence from discovery is also questionable 
                                                                                                     
 28.  See infra Parts IV–V; see also generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & 
TRAINING COMM’N, FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, BREATH TEST OPERATOR: A 
SPECIALIZED TRAINING COURSE 6 (2015) (summarizing the science behind 
breathalyzers without referencing the algorithm and source code that are integral 
to producing the relevant values admissible in court).  
 29.  See infra Parts III–IV; see also generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & 
TRAINING COMM’N, supra note 28 (neglecting to explicate the algorithms and 
source codes underlying breathalyzers).  
 30.  When TrueAllele and STRmix have been used in courts recently, the 
government has called the computer programs’ developers to the stand to testify 
about the accuracy and reliability of the programs. See Lauren Kirchner, 
Sentenced by an Algorithm: Where Traditional DNA Testing Fails, New 
Technology Takes Over, PAC. STANDARD (Nov. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/LJB6-
E2RH (last updated June 14, 2017) (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). This is not generally the case with evidence 
based on, for example, breathalyzer programs or AFISs. The difference, it seems, 
is the newness of these DNA-focused computer programs. The programs used to 
calculate breathalyzer results and match fingerprints are generally not 
challenged in court, and they certainly are not challenged in the same way by 
calling on an expert familiar with the underlying algorithms and source codes. In 
a sense, these technologies seem to have been grandfathered in under the 
criminal justice system.  
 31. See infra Part V.  
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under Brady v. Maryland32 and its progeny, as well as the 
statutory discovery requirements of some states.33 
This Article challenges the use of conviction programs  — their 
algorithms and source codes—under these secret conditions, 
arguing that greater disclosure is generally necessary to meet the 
constitutional requirements essential to the defendant having an 
opportunity to make his defense, confront witnesses, and truly 
benefit from due process guarantees. Part II describes the rise of 
the criminal justice system’s confidence in and dependence on 
predictive algorithms and their underlying source codes to aid 
judges and parole boards in making bail, sentencing, and parole 
decisions. It outlines the reasons why decisionmakers within the 
criminal justice system increasingly rely on these programs and 
also summarizes the common criticisms of this reliance. Part III 
explains that, while the benefits and drawbacks of relying on these 
predictive algorithms and their source codes are relatively well 
known, the more concerning reliance on computer programs in the 
context of convicting criminal defendants has largely gone 
unnoticed. This Part delineates three program-based conviction 
tools that prosecutorial teams use to help convict defendants: 
breathalyzers, AFISs,34 and computerized DNA interpretation 
programs.35 It also explains that the details of these programs are 
generally kept secret and that there are real questions about the 
accuracy of these programs. Part IV expands upon the secrecy 
shrouding the details of the conviction programs that prosecutors 
employ, explaining how defendants are generally denied access to 
                                                                                                     
 32.  373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 33.  See infra Part V; see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (2018) 
(requiring the state upon motion to provide “the complete files of all law 
enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and prosecutors’ offices involved in 
the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant”). 
 34.  As explained in Part IV.A.2, AFISs are not usually directly used in 
securing convictions. Instead, these programs usually provide human fingerprint 
examiners with a handful of the most likely candidate fingerprints to match 
against, for example, a fingerprint found at a crime scene. The human interpreter 
then determines whether there is a match and may testify at trial. Id. However, 
because fingerprint examiners employ questionable methods themselves in 
determining whether there is a match, the AFIS potential matches from which 
they often begin their analyses play a large part in the evidence that is eventually 
introduced at trial to convict criminal defendants. Id.  
 35.  The computer programs I refer to here are probabilistic genotyping 
systems (PGSs). 
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this information that could prove material to their cases. It also 
emphasizes the importance of transparency for testing the 
accuracy of these programs. Further, this Part explains that 
lawyers and the criminal justice system tend to revere computer 
programs and science and technology in general. Certainly, there 
is value in pursuing an objective approach to criminal justice 
determinations, but science and technology are not infallible, and 
it is important that actors within the criminal justice system 
recognize this. Finally, Part V argues that this secrecy is of 
constitutional proportions, as it denies defendants their due 
process rights to have meaningful opportunities to present full 
defenses, and it detracts from their confrontation rights to examine 
witnesses about the algorithms and source codes upon which their 
convictions are ultimately based. Employing these secret 
conviction programs even has implications for prosecutors’ duties 
under Brady and other applicable statutory disclosure 
requirements. Where police officers, prosecutors, and experts 
employ secret conviction programs, criminal defendants’ 
constitutional rights are in jeopardy. 
II. Predictive Criminal Justice Programs 
Judges, parole boards, and even prosecutors and police officers 
have all begun relying on computer algorithms and source codes in 
their roles within the criminal justice system.36 Some judges 
employ programs in setting bail to help them predict whether 
suspects are likely to appear for their court dates and whether they 
pose a danger to the public.37 And some judges use programs to 
assess the future dangerousness of offenders so that they can 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Ric Simmons, Big Data and Procedural Justice: Legitimizing 
Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 573 (2018) 
(describing criminal justice actors’ uses of algorithms in the criminal justice 
system). 
 37. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1109, 1124, 1120 (2017) (“In the pretrial detention stage, judges in many 
states routinely rely on risk assessment instruments to predict future 
dangerousness before deciding on release conditions.”); Lauryn P. Gouldin, 
Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 713–18 (2018). 
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properly sentence them.38 Many parole boards similarly rely on 
computer programs to assess the likelihood of recidivism to 
determine whether an offender should be granted parole.39 There 
are both benefits and drawbacks to relying on such a systematized 
approach to justice. To fully understand the advantages and 
disadvantages, though, it is first necessary to understand the 
different working parts of modern computer programs.  
A. Computer Programs—Algorithms and Source Codes 
Various actors within the criminal justice system  regularly 
rely on computer programs to predict behavior.40 Like typical 
computer programs, these prediction programs consist of 
algorithms and the underlying source codes to implement those 
algorithms. An algorithm is a set of rules used to solve a problem 
through a series of discrete steps.41 And “algorithm” is the term 
commentators often use to describe the programs jurisdictions in 
recent years have used to help set bail, determine sentences, and 
make parole decisions.42 How experts put these algorithms to use, 
though, complicates matters. In the age of computers, they often 
computerize these algorithms to increase efficiency. This requires 
that the algorithm be translated into source code.43 A computer 
                                                                                                     
 38.  See Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1120 (“[M]ost states have adopted some 
measure of actuarial prediction in sentencing or parole determinations.”). 
 39.  See id.  
 40.  This is sometimes referred to as “[a]ctuarial prediction.” Id. at 1118–19. 
 41.  See Algorithm, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2012) (“A procedure 
or set of rules used in calculation and problem-solving . . . a precisely defined set 
of mathematical or logical operations for the performance of a particular task.”). 
 42.  See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/2FSK-27MK (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (referring to “algorithms” 
used to predict recidivism) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Lauren Kirchner, Where Traditional DNA Testing Fails, Algorithms Take Over: 
Powerful Software Is Solving More Crimes and Raising New Questions About Due 
Process, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 4, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/9DQZ-5YKG (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2019) (discussing “algorithms” used to determine the likelihood 
that a DNA sample from a crime scene came from a particular individual) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 43.  See PELIN AKSOY & LAURA DENARDIS, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN 
THEORY 102 – 04 (2008); JUNE JAMRICH PARSONS, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COMPUTER 
CONCEPTS 2018, at 777, 785 (2018) (briefly describing algorithms and source 
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programmer can convert the algorithm into a variety of source code 
or programming languages—such as C, C++, BASIC, Python, 
Java, JavaScript, IOS, or SQL—each of which would look slightly 
different but could be generally recognizable by those competent in 
the field.44 A compiler or interpreter then translates the source 
code into object or machine code, which presents as a series of ones 
and zeros.45 This string of numbers is generally incomprehensible 
to humans. But it effects an output, which can then be used for 
various purposes, such as to predict the behaviors of criminal 
offenders.46 The technicalities and nuances of this process, though, 
generally remain hidden from the users of the program, making it 
difficult for them to understand the way in which the task is 
performed. 
B. A History of Seeking Predictions 
The criminal justice system’s harnessing of predictive power 
dates back to the late 1920s.47 Even without the power of 
computing, the criminal justice system turned to prediction 
algorithms to assess the risk of offenders’ recidivism on parole.48 
In recent years, as evidence-based practices have gained steam, 
use of these tools has ballooned.49 Not only do jurisdictions use 
                                                                                                     
codes). 
 44.  See AKSOY & DENARDIS, supra note 43, at 102–04; PARSONS, supra note 
43, at 786; MICHAEL L. SCOTT, PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE PRAGMATICS 4–5, 11, 14 
(4th ed. 2016). 
 45.  See AKSOY & DENARDIS, supra note 43, at 102–04. 
 46. See Angwin et al., supra note 42.  
 47.  See BERNARD HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION 47 (2007); Timeline of 
Computer History, COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM, https://perma.cc/R9A2-LKQF 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 48.  See Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1117–20 (briefly relating the history of 
an actuarial approach to criminal justice); see also HARCOURT, supra note 47, at 
47 (explaining that “[t]he actuarial impulse was strong [even] in the 1920s”).  
 49.  See Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. 
L. REV. 303, 312–14 (2018) (explaining that “their use has rapidly accelerated over 
recent years”); Angwin et al., supra note 42 (“[R]isk assessments . . . are 
increasingly common in courtrooms across the nation. . . . In Arizona, Colorado, 
Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Virginia, Washington, and 
Wisconsin, the results of such assessments are given to judges during criminal 
280 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 269 (2020) 
these tools in making parole decisions, but now judges also use 
them in setting bail and sentencing.50 Rapidly advancing 
technology has even further magnified the power of these 
prediction programs, and several jurisdictions now employ 
computer-based risk-assessment tools such as Correctional 
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions 
(COMPAS)—a risk assessment tool created and licensed by 
Northpointe.51  
                                                                                                     
sentencing.”); cf. Kirchner, supra note 42 (explaining that “[t]he emergence of 
algorithmic analysis programs . . . is creating a new frontier of DNA science,” that 
these “tools are so new and expensive that only a handful of local crime labs use 
them regularly,” and that “as law enforcement looks to DNA more and more 
frequently to solve even minor crimes, that seems almost certain to change”). 
50.  See Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1120–21 (“Today, actuarial prediction 
impacts almost all aspects of the criminal justice system, from the initial bail 
decision to the final parole release.”). One additional area in which computer 
programs are today playing a significant role is in policing. See ANDREW GUTHRIE 
FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE 
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 2 (2017) (describing “big data policing”). Police 
departments throughout the country now employ sophisticated programs to 
assess the likelihood of crime taking place in particular locations. See id. at 67 
(“Today, several dozen cities are using some form of predictive policing 
technology.”). Although police departments have long tried to find patterns in 
reported crimes to try to predict the locations of future crime and marshal their 
resources accordingly, technological advances have allowed these departments to 
more firmly put the power of statistics behind them to improve their predictions. 
See Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1117–20. Today, various companies license 
programs like PredPol and HunchLab to help police departments make more 
informed decisions about how best to fight crime. See HunchLab—Next 
Generation Predictive Policing Software, HUNCHLAB, https://perma.cc/5FUX-
DGPY (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (stating that it employs “advanced statistical 
models [to] forecast when and where crimes are likely to emerge”); Predict Prevent 
CrimePredictive Policing Software, PREDPOL, https://perma.cc/W98H-H56L 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (stating that PredPol “predict[s] where and when 
specific crimes are most likely to occur”). Select police departments across the 
country rely on programs like these to assist their decisions about where, when, 
and how to best police their communities. See FERGUSON, supra, at 67. 
 51. See NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 2 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/3NDH-YVAK (PDF); Sam Corbett-Davies et al., A Computer 
Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions Was Labeled Biased Against 
Blacks. It’s Actually Not That Clear., WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/375A-VT4Y (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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In general, these assessment tools are based on answers to a 
number of questions, such as: What is the offender’s marital 
status?52 What is his highest education level?53 Does he have any 
history of drug use?54 Based on the answers to these questions, the 
particular tool will predict, at least to some degree, the likelihood 
that the offender will engage in certain conduct, such as future 
criminal acts or fleeing the jurisdiction. When using an automated 
tool like COMPAS, the algorithm and underlying source code used 
to calculate the relevant risk scores are often not available to the 
defendant or even the program user.55  
COMPAS—and programs like it—are meant to improve 
objectivity, fairness, and efficiency in setting bail and doling out 
sentences.56 Finding these factors desirable, jurisdictions 
throughout the country rely on such algorithms and source codes 
to predict recidivism, which can affect bail, sentencing, and 
parole.57  
C. The Allure 
Proponents of these predictive criminal justice programs 
explain that such a methodical, evidence-based approach to 
difficult criminal justice questions will usher in a system with 
greater fairness, consistency, and accuracy.58 Our criminal justice 
                                                                                                     
 52. See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific 
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805, 811–12 (2014); 
VRAG-R SCORING SHEET 2, https://perma.cc/RM63-7GWC (PDF).  
 53.  See Starr, supra note 52, at 811–12; Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., 
The Predictive Validity of the LSI-R on a Sample of Offenders Drawn from the 
Records of the Iowa Department of Corrections Data Management System, FED. 
PROBATION, 2 (2001), https://perma.cc/5CQC-2G45 (PDF). 
 54.  See id.; VRAG-R SCORING SHEET, supra note 52, at 2. 
 55.  See infra Part IV. 
 56.  See NORTHPOINTE, supra note 51, at 2 (“In overloaded and crowded 
criminal justice systems, brevity, efficiency, ease of administration, and clear 
organization of key risk/needs data are critical. COMPAS was designed to 
optimize these practical factors.”). 
 57. See id. 
 58.  See Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., Should Prison Sentences Be Based 
On Crimes That Haven’t Been Committed Yet?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 4, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/SLH8-4ACW (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (examining some of the 
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system is riddled with concerns of biases. For example, the 
disproportionate number of black males in American prisons has 
been described as resulting from “the new Jim Crow”;59 blacks and 
Hispanics are more often the targets of stops and frisks than 
whites;60 and there have been vociferous outcries against the large 
numbers of black male youths who have recently been killed by law 
enforcement officers.61 Trying to address these problems is 
                                                                                                     
risks and benefits of using these predictive models) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Adam Neufeld, In Defense of Risk-Assessment Tools, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 22, 2017, 10:00 AM) https://perma.cc/53VZ-TK5B (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2019) (acknowledging that “[i]t may seem weird to rely on an 
impersonal algorithm to predict a person’s behavior given the enormous stakes” 
but arguing that “the gravity of the outcome—in cost, crime, and wasted human 
potential—is exactly why we should use an algorithm” in these circumstances) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); SARAH PICARD-FRITSCHE ET 
AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, DEMYSTIFYING RISK ASSESSMENT: KEY 
PRINCIPLES AND CONTROVERSIES 11–12 (2017), https://perma.cc/U9PP-5HQR 
(PDF) (emphasizing the usefulness of predictive criminal justice programs but 
also noting critics’ concerns). 
 59.  See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that the mass 
incarceration of black men in the name of the War on Drugs amounts to a “new 
Jim Crow”). 
 60. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(concluding that New York City’s “policy of indirect racial profiling . . . has 
resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of blacks and 
Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause”); ELIZABETH DAVIS & 
ANTHONY WHYDE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND 
THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 9 (2018), https://perma.cc/F3UZ-2T5M (PDF) (highlighting 
that “[a] greater percentage of blacks than whites experienced police-initiated 
contact during their most recent contact”). 
 61.  See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the 
Margins — Addressing Hidden Forms of Bias and the Politics of Which Lives 
Matter, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 711, 713–14 (2015) (explaining that the “Black Lives 
Matter” movement arose out of police killings of young, unarmed black men); 
Collier Meyerson, Another Black Boy Was Killed by Police. Will Justice Be Done 
This Time?, THE NATION (May 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/X9VS-JERC (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2019) (reacting to the many recent killings of black children by police 
officers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Brentin Mock, How 
Structural Racism is Linked to Higher Rates of Police Violence, CITYLAB (Feb. 15, 
2018), https://perma.cc/V2D7-EEH4 (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (“Many studies do 
show that racism plays a part in causing police to pull the trigger more quickly 
on black suspects. That’s usually because of the implicit racial biases of the 
individual police officer involved.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Further, Project Implicit at Harvard University suggests that biases are 
deeper and more difficult to correct than may at first be apparent. See About Us, 
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difficult, though. Decisionmakers in the criminal justice 
arena — whether judges, prosecutors, jurors, or parole board 
members—are human beings with built-in prejudices and biases, 
whether conscious or unconscious.62 Harvard University’s Project 
Implicit—an ongoing study collecting data on individuals’ 
biases — has found that nearly everyone suffers from bias.63 
Whether biases are a result of evolution—allowing our brains to 
take mental shortcuts to more easily survive64—upbringing,65 or 
culture,66 biases can be detrimental and unjust to criminal 
defendants. Biases might result in a particular defendant being 
                                                                                                     
PROJECT IMPLICIT (2011), https://perma.cc/8NUZ-Y5DB (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) 
[hereinafter PROJECT IMPLICIT] (collecting data on individuals’ implicit biases) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Kristin A. Lane et al., 
Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 431–39 (2007) 
(pointing out that nearly everyone possesses implicit biases, explaining that these 
biases are very strong and that they also predict behavior, and noting that this 
link between bias and behavior can be moderated under certain conditions). 
 62.  See PROJECT IMPLICIT, supra note 61; Lane et al., supra note 61; Annie 
Murphy Paul, Where Bias Begins: The Truth About Stereotypes, PSYCHOL. TODAY 
(May 1, 1998), https://perma.cc/6FY8-KJL8 (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) 
(“Psychologists once believed that only bigoted people used stereotypes. Now the 
study of unconscious bias is revealing the unsettling truth: We all use stereotypes, 
all the time, without knowing it. We have met the enemy of equality, and the 
enemy is us.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 63. See PROJECT IMPLICIT, supra note 61; see also Meghan J. Ryan & John 
Adams, Cultivating Judgment on the Tools of Wrongful Conviction, 68 SMU L. 
REV. 1073, 1101 (2015) (“One of the major sources of information about the 
existence of implicit biases comes from the Implicit Association Test (IAT). In this 
test, subjects are asked to ‘rapidly classify individual stimuli into’ particular 
categories, and the subjects’ rates of classification are then measured.” (internal 
citations omitted)).  
 64. See Martie G. Haselton et al., The Evolution of Cognitive Bias, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 968, 968–69 (David M. Buss ed., 2d ed. 
2016); see also Christopher Dwyer, 12 Common Biases that Affect How We Make 
Everyday Decisions, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/CFL8-
CMC5 (last visited Oct 6. 2019) (suggesting that in-group bias is evolutionary) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 65. See Eva H. Telzer et al., Amygdala Sensitivity to Race Is Not Present in 
Childhood but Emerges over Adolescence, 25 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 234, 234, 
240, 242 (2013) (suggesting that racial bias is a product of upbringing); Robert 
Wright, Nature vs. Nurture? New Research Shows Racism Isn’t Innate, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 18, 2012), https://perma.cc/HW2H-XDXN (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 66. See Paul, supra note 62 (“Much of what enters our consciousness, of 
course, comes from the culture around us.”). 
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convicted when he would not have been convicted in the absence of 
bias, receiving a longer sentence than someone who committed the 
same crime but was not of the same race, getting his bail set at a 
higher amount than someone of a different religion, or not being 
granted parole when someone of a different ethnicity would have 
been granted parole.67 Decisionmakers can mitigate their biases 
through education if the decisionmaker acknowledges the problem 
and has an open mind about the offered education,68 so there is 
some hope for alleviating biases within the criminal justice system. 
Despite being a concern that commentators have recognized for 
years, though, biases within the system persist.    
Aside from biases within the system, there is also the problem 
of other inequities, which is inherent in a system that generally 
relies on different decisionmakers in each case.69 This concern 
about lack of uniformity explains the rise of mandatory sentencing 
guidelines in this country70 (which were later found to be 
unconstitutional71) and, to some extent, mandatory minimum 
sentences.72 As Marvin Frankel famously explained, a judge might 
                                                                                                     
 67.  See Angwin et al., supra note 42 (“For more than two centuries, the key 
decisions in the legal process, from pretrial release to sentencing to parole, have 
been in the hands of human beings guided by their instincts and personal 
biases.”). 
 68.  See Lane et al., supra note 61, at 437–39 (stating that implicit social 
cognitions may change based on varied experiences and environments); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME. L. 
REV. 1195, 1226–32 (2009) (describing how training can mitigate judicial bias); 
Ryan & Adams, supra note 63, at 1102 (“Providing some hope for limiting how 
these biases might affect decisionmaking, . . . studies suggest that implicit biases 
can possibly be reduced or at least that decisionmakers, provided proper 
motivation, are capable of compensating for their biases.”). 
 69. See generally Anthony Niblett, Tracking Inconsistent Judicial Behavior, 
34 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. (2013) (examining inconsistencies in judicial 
decisionmaking). 
 70. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 255 (2005) (“Congress enacted 
the sentencing statutes in major part to achieve greater uniformity in sentencing, 
i.e., to increase the likelihood that offenders who engage in similar real conduct 
would receive similar sentences.”). 
 71. See generally id. at 245 (holding that the mandatory federal sentencing 
guidelines are unconstitutional). 
 72.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 13–14 (1991), 
https://perma.cc/LBH5-A4CG (PDF) (“Mandatory minimums are meant to ensure 
that defendants convicted of similar offenses receive penalties that at least begin 
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sentence a defendant to an entire additional year in prison just 
because the defendant spoke disrespectfully to the judge.73 This 
concern of one offender receiving harsher treatment than a 
similarly situated offender just because of his bad luck is a 
continuing one. 
Even if defendants are not affected by biases or other 
inequities within the system, they are often subject to guesswork 
by judges and parole boards.74 Judges and parole boards may base 
                                                                                                     
at the same minimal point.”). But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking 
Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 210 (1993) (explaining that 
“[e]nsuring equal treatment of like offenders prevents one form of disparity, but 
the resulting equal treatment of unlike offenders creates another serious 
problem—excessive uniformity” and stating that “[e]xcessive uniformity is 
inevitable under mandatories because the statutes necessarily single out just one 
or a very small number of factors to determine the minimum sentence”). 
 73.  MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 18 
(1972). Frankel famously related: 
One story concerns a casual anecdote over cocktails in a rare 
conversation among judges touching the subject of sentencing. Judge 
X, to designate him in a lawyerlike way, told of a defendant for whom 
the judge, after reading the presentence report, had decided tentatively 
upon a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing 
in the courtroom, after hearing counsel, Judge X invited the defendant 
to exercise his right to address the court in his own behalf. The 
defendant took a sheaf of papers from his pocket and proceeded to read 
from them, excoriating the judge, and “kangaroo court” in which he’d 
been tried, and the legal establishment in general. Completing the 
story, Judge X said, “I listened without interrupting. Finally, when he 
said he was through, I simply gave the son of a bitch five years instead 
of four.” None of the three judges listening to that (including me) 
tendered a whisper of dissent, let alone a scream of outrage. But think 
about it. . . . a year in prison for speaking disrespectfully to a judge. 
Id. 
 74. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Politics of Predicting Criminal Violence, 86 
MICH. L. REV. 1322, 1325 (1988) (explaining Stephen Gottfredson and Marc 
Miller’s response to questions about the usefulness of actuarial tools: “Because 
judges and parole boards do predict and because their unaided predictions are 
even less accurate than chance, actuarial predictions are better than the current 
system of implicit and ignorant guesses.”); Sam B. Warner & Henry B. Cabot, 
Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice During the Past Fifty Years, 
50 HARV. L. REV. 583, 607 (1937) (referring to judges’ and parole boards’ 
sentencing and release decisions as “a matter of guesswork”); cf. William W. 
Wilkins et al., Competing Sentencing Policies in a “War on Drugs” Era, 28 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 305, 309 (1993) (explaining that, before the federal guidelines, 
“judges frequently engaged in the ‘guessing game’ of imposing sentences in 
anticipation of potential release dates authorized by the Parole Commission”).  
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their bail, sentencing, and parole decisions on a broad array of 
factors, including their own experiences both inside and outside of 
the courtroom and parole board hearing room.75 But they 
historically have not made their decisions based on social science 
research meant to assess the probability that any particular 
defendant will make his court appearances, recidivate, or pose 
other risks to society.76 
Using computer programs in setting bail, sentencing, and 
deciding parole issues can be effective in achieving fairness across 
cases. Computer algorithms and their source codes are automated 
approaches to criminal justice, and the individual decisionmakers 
within the system—from judges to parole board members—can 
potentially dole out justice without being influenced by, for 
example, what they had for breakfast, if they depend on computer 
programs to make their decisions for them. Relying on these 
programs can also help judges and other decisionmakers avoid 
injecting their own biases into decisions on bail, sentencing, and 
parole.77 In these senses, computer-program-based 
decisionmaking serves the goals of system-wide fairness and 
consistency. Further, these computer programs are generally built 
on social science data to produce more accurate predictions about 
human behavior.78 In this sense, they may be considered better 
than the hunches on which judges and parole boards base their 
decisions.  
Employing computer programs to resolve criminal justice 
issues can also inject efficiency into the system.79 Automated 
                                                                                                     
 75.  See Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Neilsen, Examining Empathy: 
Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 
324 (2012) (stating that “judges do not completely abandon their experiences 
when deciding cases”). 
 76. See Johnson, supra note 74, at 1325 (noting that judges’ and parole 
boards’ “unaided predictions are even less accurate than chance”); Warner & 
Cabot, supra note 74, at 607 (referring to judicial “guesswork” in sentencing and 
noting that the information on which sentencing judges have traditionally based 
these decisions has been quite limited). 
 77.  See Neufeld, supra note 58 (“[A]lgorithms aren’t directly subject to 
human cognitive biases . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 78. See PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 58, at 8–10 (describing the 
development of risk assessment tools using social science research). 
 79. See Sarah Fishel et al., Computer Risk Algorithms and Judicial Decision-
making, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Jan. 2018), https://perma.cc/S2XY-9ZFS (last visited 
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justice is often swift justice.80 Not surprisingly, then, players 
within the criminal justice system are beginning to rely more 
heavily on computer programs to keep the machinery of  
justice—or at least of the system—moving. 81  
D. Predictable Criticisms 
Although adopting a data-driven approach to criminal jusitce 
is alluring, some commentators have criticized the use of computer 
programs in all of these areas—in setting bail, sentencing, and 
making parole decisions—for embedding and exacerbating biases 
in the criminal justice system.82 Most often, these commentators 
focus their criticisms on the particular factors that control the 
algorithms’ outputs.83 For example, factors like employment 
status, marital status, and educational level—factors often used in 
assessments of future dangerousness—are often proxies for race.84 
                                                                                                     
Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 80. See id. (“[L]egal decision-makers can drastically increase the expediency 
of their decision-making within an often slow and overburdened system.”).  
 81.  See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 110 (2012) 
(stating that, “[w]hen judges and scholars evaluate criminal procedure, they tend 
to focus on efficiency”). 
 82. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 52, at 821; Angwin et al., supra note 42 
(asserting that COMPAS results “turned up significant racial disparities”). 
 83.  A study by ProPublica exposed racial disparities in the results produced 
by Northpointe’s predictive algorithm COMPAS. See Angwin et al., supra note 42. 
According to the study, the algorithm was “particularly likely to falsely flag black 
defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice 
the rate as white defendants.” Id. 
 84.  See CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD & HENRY F. FRADELLA, PUNISHING 
POVERTY: HOW BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION FUEL INEQUALITIES IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 121 (2019) (explaining that “there is little doubt that both general 
and pretrial risk assessment instruments rely on static risk factors”—“such as 
age, sex, marital status, education level, employment history, and financial 
status”—"that are statistically associated with race and ethnicity”); Angele 
Christin et al., Courts and Predictive Algorithms, DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW 
ERA OF POLICING AND JUSTICE, DATACIVILRIGHTS.ORG (Oct. 27, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/DA7Z-KVR5 (PDF) (arguing that, “[r]egardless of their impact, 
the very method used to build these algorithms might make them 
unconstitutional” because, even though “[n]one of the sentencing instruments use 
race as a variable, . . . many variables included in the models play the role of 
‘proxies’ for race, in that they strongly correlate with race and reflect racial bias”); 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 
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Even if including these factors leads to more accurate predictions, 
many consider it morally or politically repugnant to use them in 
decisions affecting individuals’ futures because they lead to 
negative outcomes disproportionately affecting certain races.85  
In addition to these race-based criticisms, one might argue 
that, in achieving greater uniformity and fairness across cases, the 
system is sacrificing fairness in individual cases. This is the same 
criticism lodged against other attempts to achieve system-wide 
fairness, such as the mandatory guideline sentencing regimes of 
the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s.86 Requiring judges to impose 
pre-set punishments for particular crimes meant that judges often 
could not tailor offenders’ sentences to their individual 
circumstances or the particulars of the committed offense.87 
According to many, this resulted in great injustices.88 Attempts to 
achieve uniformity among cases often translates into not being 
able to individualize the sentence or other criminal justice outcome 
in the particular case at bar.89 In some sense, then, fairness across 
cases comes at the price of fairness within an individual case. 
                                                                                                     
27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015); Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: 
An “Unsettled” Proposition, 30 JUST. Q. 270, 279–84 (2013). 
 85. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for 
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 920 (1991) (“Guidelines designed to 
promote equality have produced unequal results—results that scatter years of 
imprisonment almost by lottery. These results would have been inconceivable in 
the old regime of discretionary sentencing.”); Don J. DeBenedictis, How Long Is 
Too Long?, 79 A.B.A. J. 74, 74 (1993) (“Critics charge that mandatory sentences, 
by denying use even of the guidelines’ adjustments and departures, prevent 
judges from considering a defendant's individual circumstances or culpability. 
Mandatory minimums are inherently unfair, they say, because they force judges 
to sentence crimes, not criminals.”); David Yellen, What Juvenile Court 
Abolitionists Can Learn from the Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 
577, 587 (1996) (“Judges throughout the country complain that some sentencing 
guidelines and virtually all mandatory minimum statutes force them to impose 
unjust sentences because the judges are precluded from considering the unique 
circumstances of offenders.”). 
 87.  See Yellen, supra note 86, at 587. 
 88.  See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA 167–70 (1995); Alschuler, supra note 86, at 920; DeBenedictis, supra 
note 86, at 74; Yellen, supra note 86, at 587. 
 89.  See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.  
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For example, one of these programs might find that, in 
general, a single man who has not received a high school diploma 
(and who happens to be black) is more likely to recidivate than a 
married man who has graduated from college (and who happens to 
be white). But that does not mean that a particular single man who 
has not received a high school diploma may be more likely to 
recidivate than anyone else. One might say that his race—even 
though not specifically being taken into account—is being held 
against him because it correlates with his marital status and 
educational level. This is a valid criticism, but it is of course true 
that, regardless of race or any other factor, these predictions of 
future dangerousness, or anything else, are only risk 
assessments.90 They are generalizations based on the limited data 
available.91 
Beyond these race- and individualization-based criticisms, 
some commentators have argued that these criminal justice 
programs are not as accurate as they might seem anyway.92 First, 
the predictions the programs generate are only as good as the data 
on which they rely.93 As Professors Wayne Logan and Andrew 
Ferguson have explained, there are numerous sources of error 
involved with both the collection and generation of this data.94 
Relatedly, there are questions about the accuracy of the 
algorithms’ and source codes’ outputs. In certain studies, some of 
these prediction programs’ results have proved to be only about as 
                                                                                                     
 90.  See Sam Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 51. 
 91.  See id.  
 92.  See, e.g., Starr, supra note 52, at 842 (“The instruments’ first serious 
limitation is that they do not provide anything even approaching a precise 
prediction of an individual’s recidivism risk.”); Angwin et al., supra note 42 
(“When a full range of crimes were taken into account—including misdemeanors 
such as driving with an expired license—the algorithm was somewhat more 
accurate than a coin flip. Of those deemed likely to re-offend, 61 percent were 
arrested for any subsequent crimes within two years.”). 
 93.  See Elizabeth E. Joh, Feeding the Machine: Policing, Crime Data, & 
Algorithims, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287, 294 (2017) (explaining that 
“algorithmic decisionmaking has been subjected to the ‘garbage in, garbage out’ 
critique: that any decision is as good or as bad as the data relied upon by the 
program”). 
 94.  See generally Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing 
Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541 (2016) (summarizing the numerous 
sources of error associated with data used within the criminal justice system). 
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accurate as outcomes based purely on chance.95 For example, in 
2016, ProPublica investigated the “largely hidden effect of 
algorithms in American life” and found risk assessment measures 
to be “remarkably unreliable.”96 In particular, ProPublica 
gathered risk assessment scores assigned to a large sample of 
arrestees in Broward County, Florida.97 It then examined how 
many of these arrestees “were charged with new crimes over the 
next two years, the same benchmark used by the creators of the 
[COMPAS] algorithm.”98 ProPublica determined that, “when a full 
range of crimes were taken into account . . . the algorithm was 
[only] somewhat more accurate than a coin flip. Of those deemed 
likely to re-offend, 61 percent were arrested for any subsequent 
crimes within two years.”99 These findings have raised serious 
questions about the accuracy of at least Northpointe’s program.100 
Additionally, many people commonly understand risk 
assessment programs as predicting a defendant’s risk of future 
dangerousness; in reality, however, a number of these programs 
instead only order defendants by their risks of future 
                                                                                                     
 95. See Angwin et al., supra note 42; see also Ferguson, supra note 37, at 
1144 (stating in reference to predictive policing programs that, “[l]ike an 
old-school weather forecast, the data can provide localized forecasts—‘cloudy with 
a chance of murder’—with a significant degree of variability and fallibility”).  
 96. See Angwin et al., supra note 42. 
 97. See id.  
 98. Id.; see also NORTHPOINTE, supra note 51, at 27 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/A665-WHGU (PDF) (“The recidivism risk scale was developed to 
predict new offenses subsequent to the COMPAS assessment date. The outcome 
used for the original scale construction was a new misdemeanor or felony offense 
within two years of the COMPAS administration date.”), cited in Angwin et al., 
supra note 42. 
 99. Angwin et al., supra note 42. A study by the founders of Northpointe 
concluded that the predictive validity of the algorithm was around seventy to 
eighty percent and that its reliability hovered around seventy percent. See Tim 
Brennan et al., Evaluating the Predictive Validity of the COMPAS Risk and Needs 
Assessment System, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 21, 31–34 (2009). 
 100. It seems that there are a number of shortcomings to ProPublica’s study, 
however, including sample size, sample breadth, and potential confounding 
variables. See Angwin et al., supra note 42. Further, ProPublica’s study focused 
on just one risk assessment algorithm—Northpointe’s COMPAS. Although this 
system is widely employed, it is not the only algorithm in use and thus cannot 
alone condemn all risk assessment algorithms. 
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dangerousness.101 Imagine that you have one group of defendants 
who range from a ten percent chance of recidivating to a sixty 
percent chance of recidivating and another group of defendants 
who range from a two percent chance of recidivating to a ten 
percent chance of recidivating. The program would score an equal 
number of defendants within each group as having a high risk of 
future dangerousness, and it would score an equal number within 
each group as having a low risk of future dangerousness.102 In 
other words, the scores are curved depending on the other 
members within the defendant group. This means that the 
intended “accuracy” in this context relates to the accuracy of the 
ordering rather than the accuracy of a risk-of-recidivism 
calculation. Such an approach is generally much less useful if 
sentencing and parole decisions are to be based on true risks of 
recidivism rather than on, for example, the availability of 
resources like empty prison beds.103 
                                                                                                     
 101.  See, e.g., NORTHPOINTE, COMPAS RISK & NEED ASSESSMENT SYSTEM: 
SELECTED QUESTIONS POSED BY INQUIRING AGENCIES, at 5 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/73A6-2TK7 (PDF) (describing how COMPAS scores and ranks 
individuals).  
 102. See, e.g., id.; see also Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 
2218, 2246 (2019) (explaining that a popular measure of risk assessment tools’ 
performance is “area under the curve,” which “conveys the probability that, for 
any two people selected at random in the data, the algorithm will correctly order 
them in terms of risk” (emphasis added)); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous 
Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 513 (2018) (explaining that “[a] classification as 
high risk does not assert that Person A will fail to appear or be rearrested unless 
restrained” but instead only “purports to . . . rank Person A relative to the rest of 
the population upon which the instrument was developed”); cf. Jessica M. Eaglin, 
Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 87 (2017) (explaining that 
“[t]ranslating tool outcomes into risk categories is a highly subjective, 
policy-oriented process” and that “[t]his decision requires some expertise not only 
in what the tool is predicting, but also in how society interprets the numerical 
outcome’s meaning”: “In short, where developers place cut-off points reflects a 
normative judgment about how much likelihood of risk is acceptable in society 
without intervention.”).  
 103.  If the availability of resources like empty prison beds is to be a significant 
factor in these determinations, this might be a reason to find a set number or 
percentage of low-risk or high-risk defendants regardless of the true risk of the 
defendant. 
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In general, there has been little investigation into the accuracy 
of risk assessment computer programs.104 The few researchers 
assessing these programs are generally the programs’ developers 
themselves, who obviously have conflicts of interest; they have 
financial and reputational interests in the popularity and wide 
acceptance of the programs.105 Still, many jurisdictions have 
already adopted these programs,106 and many more are 
considering adopting them in the future.107 They have often done 
so without fully understanding or testing the accuracy of the 
results produced by the programs. 
III. Conviction Programs 
Critics have been pushing back against prediction programs 
used for bail, sentencing, and parole, but they have largely 
overlooked the use of computer programs for obtaining convictions. 
As courts and parole boards have, over the years, been increasingly 
relying on computer programs to aid in criminal justice 
decisionmaking, police officers, forensic scientists, and prosecutors 
have quietly been relying on computer programs to produce 
various forms of incriminating evidence.108 Longstanding 
examples of this include evidence created by breathalyzers and 
AFISs.109 Further, the criminal justice system’s reliance on 
conviction programs has reached into a new era wherein actors 
rely on evidence produced by, for example, probabilistic genotyping 
                                                                                                     
 104. See Angwin et al., supra note 42 (“There have been few independent 
studies of these criminal risk assessments.”). 
 105. See id.  
 106.  See id. (noting that “many jurisdictions have adopted Northpointe’s 
software before rigorously testing whether it works”). 
 107. See, e.g., Jolie McCullogh, Courts Have Called Texas Bail Practices 
Unconstitutional. Will That Push This Year’s Reform Efforts to Success?, TEX. 
TRIB. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/8EXT-XSZY (last visited Oct. 3, 2019) 
(“[Texas] State Sen. John Whitmire, D-Houston, and state Rep. Andrew Murr, 
R-Junction, announced Monday at the Capitol that they have again filed 
legislation that would implement a risk-assessment tool for judges to use when 
making bail decisions, among other proposals.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 108.  See infra Part III.A.   
 109. Some other examples include radar guns and lidar detectors. 
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systems (PGSs).110 Although many of these technologies have 
escaped effective and arresting criticism, they are actually more 
pernicious than the prediction programs that are under attack. 
Conviction programs are different from prediction programs in 
important ways, including that prosecutors and experts regularly 
present them as having the imprimatur of science and that more 
is simply at stake when the question is one of innocence rather 
than one of temporary pretrial confinement or punishment for 
those already determined guilty.111 
A. An Array of Conviction Programs 
Prosecutors, judges, and juries today rely on a wide range of 
evidence to convict criminal defendants. Much of this evidence is 
produced by scientific and technological research that is captured 
in generally inaccessible computer programs and their underlying 
algorithms and source codes. Some of these technologies, like 
breathalyzers and AFISs, have been around for decades,112 while 
others, like PGSs, are new and emerging developments.113 The 
criminal justice actors who turn to these technologies for damning 
evidence of guilt generally blindly rely on these programs and 
unquestioningly accept their outputs. This may not be surprising 
considering that the technologies are complicated and are viewed 
in light of the objectivity and verifiability of science. But it raises 
the question of whether these programs are quite as accurate as 
they seem to be. 
                                                                                                     
 110.  See Kirchner, supra note 42 (noting that TrueAllele, a PGS, was first 
used in a criminal case in 2009).  
 111.  See infra Part III.B. 
 112. See infra Part III.A.1.  
 113.  One might classify these technologies as “[l]itigation-[r]elated [g]adgetry 
and [s]oftware.” Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 2013–20 
(2017). 
294 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 269 (2020) 
1. Breathalyzers114 and Automated Fingerprint Identification 
Systems 
Criminal justice actors regularly employ computer programs 
in carrying out their duties, and, in many areas, they have relied 
on these same technologies for decades.115 For example, when a 
police officer pulls over a suspected drunk driver, he often has the 
driver blow into a breathalyzer machine to determine the driver’s 
blood or breath alcohol content.116 In all states, a reading of 0.08 or 
higher is, alone, a ground for a driving-while-intoxicated 
conviction, regardless of whether the driver’s behavior suggested 
that he was impaired.117 The breathalyzer reading is based on an 
internal algorithm and underlying source code that are generally 
unknown by both the police officer and the driver. Similarly, when 
a forensic scientist tries to use an AFIS to match a latent print 
found at a crime scene to a known print in a law enforcement 
database, she employs a computer program generally developed by 
an independent company.118 As with the breathalyzer operator, the 
fingerprint examiner is generally unaware of how the algorithm 
determines whether the prints match and the underlying source 
code implementing that calculation.119 Yet, compared to the recent 
focus on prediction programs, commentators have given relatively 
little attention to reliance on these technologies within the 
criminal justice system.120 This is despite the fact that the same 
                                                                                                     
 114.  Throughout this article, I use the term “breathalyzer” in a generic sense. 
There have historically been many breathalyzer devices, such as the 
Drunk-O-Meter, Intoxilyzer, and the Breathalyzer, itself. 
115.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
116.  Blood alcohol content is calculated by first measuring the breath alcohol 
content in the provided breath sample. 
 117. See Blood Alcohol Concentration Limits for Enforcement of Impaired 
Driving Laws — U.S. States—2001, ALCOMETERS, https://perma.cc/G9XL-3HA5 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Blood Alcohol Concentration Limits] 
(listing criminalized blood alcohol concentration levels by state) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 118.  See Interview with James Loudermilk, Senior Director for Innovation 
and Customer Solutions, IDEMIA Nat’l Sec. Sol’ns (July 15, 2019). 
 119. See id. The FBI declined to comment on this. See E-mail from Jeffrey 
Heinze, Supervisory Special Agent, Office of Public Affairs, FBI, to author (Feb. 
3, 2020, 08:50 CST) (on file with author). 
 120.  See supra Part II.C–D.  
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concerns of accuracy exist in the conviction context as in the 
prediction context.121 With respect to conviction programs, the 
allure of relying on computerized, “scientific” justice is strong, just 
like in the context of prediction programs.122 These programs offer 
an air of fairness, consistency, and accuracy by operating according 
to set algorithms and source codes that are thought to be built on 
sound research.123 In reality, though, there may be insufficient 
research or validation studies propping up many of these programs 
or the algorithms and source codes on which they are built.124 
Instead, many of these technologies, have, in a sense, been 
grandfathered into the current system. The problem is that these 
technologies are not being seriously questioned. Judges, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other actors within the 
criminal justice system often blindly accept these technologies as 
accurate and reliable evidence supporting convictions. That hardly 
anyone is seriously questioning these technologies is disquieting. 
2. New Technology: Probabilistic Genotyping Systems 
Commentators have paid significantly more attention to 
criminal justice actors’ recent use of the cutting-edge technology of 
PGSs. Today, prosecutors regularly rely on DNA tests and 
analyses to secure convictions in court.125 In fact, some prosecutors 
complain that, because jurors are so used to seeing DNA evidence 
on television shows like CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, they often 
demand DNA evidence before voting to convict, even if DNA 
                                                                                                     
 121.  See supra Part II.D.  
 122.  See supra Part II.C. 
 123.  See Katherine Kwong, Note, The Algorithm Says You Did It: The Use of 
Black Box Algorithms to Analyze Complex DNA Evidence, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
275, 276 (2018) (explaining there is not enough information released to determine 
the fairness of these algorithms and source codes). 
 124. See infra notes 206–226 and accompanying text; cf. Ryan, supra note 14 
(discussing the insufficiency of research supporting fingerprint matching). 
 125.  Prosecutors rely on DNA analyses employing complex statistical 
techniques to secure convictions, but these programs are also sometimes used to 
exonerate those who have been wrongfully convicted. In fact, TrueAllele—one of 
these programs—was recently employed to free a wrongfully convicted man. See 
Kirchner, supra note 42.  
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evidence is not available in the case.126 Even if DNA evidence is 
found at a crime scene, on a victim, or in some other incriminating 
location, though, it sometimes may be in a state too contaminated 
or diluted for analysis.127 Additionally, DNA that has not been 
properly preserved generally becomes ineligible for analysis after 
a week, and, depending on where the DNA came from, maybe 
sooner.128 More problematic today, a DNA quantity on the order of 
picograms is ordinarily necessary for examination.129 Further, a 
DNA sample that is comprised of multiple contributing DNA 
samples may not be ripe for analysis because it is difficult to 
disaggregate which DNA alleles belong to which contributors.130 In 
recent years, though, researchers have developed computer 
programs to run statistical analyses on these types of low-level and 
mixed samples so that analysts can determine the probability that 
any particular individual was a contributor to the DNA sample at 
                                                                                                     
 126. See Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing 
Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1050 (2006) 
(explaining that “the ‘CSI effect’ is a term that legal authorities and the mass 
media have coined to describe a supposed influence that watching the television 
show CSI: Crime Scene Investigation has on juror behavior” and that the supposed 
effect is “that jurors who see the high-quality forensic evidence presented on CSI 
raise their standards in real trials, in which actual evidence is typically more 
flawed and uncertain” and that, “[a]s a result, these CSI-affected jurors are 
alleged to acquit defendants more frequently”). 
 127. See William C. Thompson et al., Forensic DNA Statistics: Still 
Controversial in Some Cases, CHAMPION, Dec. 2012, at 12 (“When labs try to ‘type’ 
samples that contain too little DNA, or DNA that is too degraded, the results of 
the DNA test can be unreliable.”). 
 128. See Karl M. McDonald, DNA Forensic Testing and Use of DNA Rape Kits 
in Cases of Rape and Sexual Assault, FORENSIC MAG. (Jan. 26, 2015, 8:21 AM), 
https://perma.cc/8XT4-6M7G (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). DNA from fingernail scrapings is generally 
viable for two days, as is DNA from skin-to-skin contact. Id. DNA from a penis 
can be viable for about twelve hours. Id. And “[f]ibers of anything put on the head 
can last up to seven days.” Id.  
 129.  See Roland A.H. van Oorschot et al., Forensic Trace DNA: A Review, 10 
INVESTIGATIVE GENETICS 3 (2010) (stating that “[t]race DNA typically refers to 
either the very limited and/or invisible biological samples and/or amounts of DNA 
less than 100 pg” but that “some laboratories use a 200 pg limit as the threshold 
limit”); cf. JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING 111 (2010) 
(“Typically 0.5 to 2.10 ng of input human DNA is optimal with current commercial 
STR kits.”). A picogram = 1 x 10-12 grams. 
 130.  See William C. Thompson et al., supra note 127, at 12, 14. 
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issue.131 Forensic analysts in the United States primarily use 
TrueAllele and STRmix for this purpose, but other programs exist 
as well.132  
When DNA analysts cannot discern which “peaks and valleys” 
produced by their testing should be paired together because they 
belong to one individual and not to the others whose DNA is also 
present in the sample, TrueAllele and STRmix have the ability to 
further the evaluation.133 These programs run statistical analyses, 
“calculat[ing] the probability of the peak heights [in the DNA 
profile] given all the possible genotype combinations for the 
individual contributors.”134 Accordingly, TrueAllele and STRmix 
purportedly can assess the probability that the sample contains 
the DNA of an individual with a known DNA profile.135 But, 
because an algorithm embedded in a computer program formulates 
                                                                                                     
 131.  See Michael D. Coble & Jo-Anne Bright, Probabilistic Genotyping 
Software: An Overview, 38 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 219, 221 (2019). 
TrueAllele was first used for forensic analysis in the late 1990s, see History, 
CYBERGENETICS, https://perma.cc/J2SK-NKHU (last visited May 24, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review), and was first used in a criminal case 
in 2009, see Kirchner, supra note 42. Coming onto the scene somewhat later, 
STRmix was first used for casework in August of 2012. See What Can STRmix 
Do?, STRMIX, https://perma.cc/789D-2AW2 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 132.   These are “probabilistic genotyping” programs. Kirchner, supra note 42. 
Analysts employ these programs when working with evidence that includes DNA 
mixtures—those containing DNA from multiple individuals. See Logan Koepke, 
Should Secret Code Help Convict?, CRIM. JUST., Mar. 24, 2016 (“TrueAllele 
Casework is a proprietary computer program that parses DNA mixtures—samples 
that include genetic code from more than one person.”). 
 133.  See Coble & Bright, supra note 131, at 220–21; Keopke, supra note 132 
(explaining that “TrueAllele looks to pick up where most forensic labs would leave 
off”).  
 134. See Coble & Bright, supra note 131, at 221 (“These models take the 
quantitative information from the DNA profile and calculate the probability of 
the peak heights given all the possible genotype combinations for the individual 
contributors.”); see Koepke, supra note 132. As Logan Koepke has explained with 
respect to TrueAllele, these programs “compare the actual DNA data to different 
statistical models, weighing the probability that the data matches the model,” and 
they “do[] this by examining 100,000 different combinations of possible variables 
and how well each proposed variable might explain the DNA data.” Koepke, supra 
note 132. 
 135. See Koepke, supra note 132 (“Essentially, algorithms compare the actual 
DNA data to different statistical models, weighing the probability that the data 
matches the model.”).  
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the analysis, and because the underlying source code carries out 
the calculations, the details of the process are largely unknown to 
the DNA analysts employing the program.136 Not surprisingly, the 
criminal defendants involved, as well as their lawyers, are 
similarly generally unaware of how these PGSs reach their 
advanced match determinations. 
Despite criminal justice actors’ lack of understanding about 
the intricacies of these PGSs, uses of TrueAllele and STRmix 
analyses to support criminal convictions have skyrocketed.137 As of 
April 2015, TrueAllele evidence had been used to convict criminal 
defendants “in over 500 cases . . . with the majority of those 
convictions occurring during the previous full year.”138 Prosecutors 
are also using STRmix to secure convictions,139 although the 
numbers are less clear here, as STRmix is relatively new to the 
field. Although STRmix was first admitted in a U.S. court in only 
December 2015,140 some jurisdictions are already switching from 
                                                                                                     
 136. As Michael Coble and Jo-Anne Bright have stated, the “software should 
not be treated as a ‘black box’ where something magical happens to generate the 
statistic.” Coble & Bright, supra note 131, at 223. “It is imperative the end user 
understand the underlying mathematics (at least to a conceptual level), 
assumptions, models and limitations of the software program to convey how the 
program works to the trier of fact.” Id. This is a challenge, though, as many 
examiners have been trained to analyze DNA using a different framework. See 
id. (“Transitioning to the [Likelihood Ratio] and understanding the nuances of 
building relevant propositions based upon case scenarios can be challenging to 
users accustomed to a frequentist view of probability.”). 
 137.  See Darlene Dang, DNA Software Claims to Prevent Wrongful 
Convictions, but Lacks Third-Party Validation, HUFF. POST (Apr. 7, 2016, 4:40 
PM), https://perma.cc/Q7WU-2DB9 (last updated Apr. 7, 2017) (last visited Oct. 
4, 2019) (“This groundbreaking technology helped convict criminals in over 500 
cases in the past five years, with the majority of those convictions occurring last 
year.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  See Kirchner, supra note 42 (“The U.S. Army and the FBI use 
STRmix . . . as do several public crime labs across the nation.”). 
 140.  See John S. Hausman, Michigan Judge’s Landmark DNA Ruling Could 
Revolutionize CSI Work, MLIVE (Dec. 23, 2015), https://perma.cc/PKN6-SWXQ 
(last updated Jan. 19, 2019) (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (referring to STRmix and 
stating that “a Michigan judge has made the nation’s first ruling on a new 
approach to analyzing DNA results that could revolutionize crime-scene 
investigation and court cases”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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TrueAllele to STRmix, so STRmix’s numbers are already on the 
rise.141  
B. The Especially Troubling Nature of Conviction Programs 
Conviction programs like those powering breathalyzers, 
AFISs, and PGSs are fundamentally different from the prediction 
programs that critics continue to attack and that have received 
more significant attention. Prediction programs focus on human 
behavior—roughly assessing the probability that a particular 
offender will, for example, recidivate.142 Conviction programs, on 
the other hand, do not focus on behavior in this way. Instead, they 
measure in some approximate sense the probability that the 
individual in question has a particular biological characteristic. 
What is the blood or breath alcohol content of the defendant? What 
are the characteristics—the “minutiae”—of the defendant’s 
fingerprints? Are his alleles the same as the alleles found in the 
DNA sample found at the crime scene? Whereas prediction 
programs draw on the social sciences—they are supposedly based 
on studies about how certain past conditions have affected human 
behavior143—conviction programs at least purportedly draw from 
the hard sciences. DNA analysis is the best example of this; it is 
the “gold standard” for modern-day forensic evidence.144 The study 
of DNA grew out of the biology, chemistry, and biochemistry 
departments of universities.145 And scientists across the globe 
                                                                                                     
 141.  See Kirchner, supra note 42 (“New York City’s Office of the Chief Medical 
Examiner recently announced that it will switch to STRmix in 2017.”). 
 142.  See supra Part II.A. 
 143.  See, e.g., NORTHPOINTE, supra note 51, at 26–46 (describing the social 
science underlying the secret prediction algorithm embedded in COMPAS). 
 144.  See DONALD E. SHELTON, FORENSIC SCIENCE EVIDENCE: CAN THE LAW 
KEEP UP WITH SCIENCE? 190 (2012) (“The prosecution use of DNA in criminal 
cases has become the new ‘gold standard’ of criminal identification techniques.”); 
NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
A PATH FORWARD 130 (2009) (stating that DNA is “the standard against which 
many other forensic individualization techniques are [now] judged”). But see ERIN 
MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL: THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA xii (2015) (explaining 
that, although DNA offers “innumerable benefits” for the criminal justice system, 
caution must be used in employing and relying on DNA analysis). 
 145.  See NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., supra note 144, at 130; see also Meghan J. 
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study DNA and related areas. To the average person, however, 
DNA analysis is cloaked in mystery. With prosecutors’ arguments 
and experts’ testimony often providing random match probabilities 
smaller than one in several billion or trillion,146 DNA evidence 
seems almost bullet-proof. But, in the difficult DNA cases—those 
involving low-level samples or complex mixtures of multiple 
individuals’ DNA and thus requiring PGS analysis—underneath 
those probabilities are the algorithms and source codes of the 
computer programs calculating the relevant statistics. And the 
forensic examiner ordinarily is unaware of the nuances of these 
algorithms and source codes. 
Although it is no secret that there is some uncertainty in 
prediction, the way that prosecutors present evidence related to 
conviction is often on the level of certainty.147 For example, 
fingerprint examiners, whose conclusions are often based on AFIS 
outcomes, generally testify as to whether there is a “match” or “no 
match” rather than testifying about the probability that the 
fingerprint found at the crime scene came from the criminal 
defendant in the case.148 This level of certainty by examiners is 
rampant in the areas of forensic study.149 Similarly, onlookers 
                                                                                                     
Ryan, Miranda’s Truth: The Importance of Adversarial Testing and Dignity in 
Confession Law, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 413, 428 (2017) (“DNA evidence is thought to 
be incredibly reliable, due in part to its development from the research culture of 
universities . . . .”). 
 146.   See BUTLER, supra note 129, at 247, 251.  
 147.  See Joseph B. Kadane & Jonathan J. Koehler, Certainty & Uncertainty 
in Reporting Fingerprint Evidence, DAEDALUS, Fall 2018, at 120 (“Although the 
ACE-V process is subjective, fingerprint examiners have historically claimed that 
their identifications are 100 percent certain, and that there is virtually no chance 
that an error has occurred.”). 
 148. See NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., supra note 144, at 141–42 (explaining that 
“SWGFAST has promulgated three acceptable conclusions resulting from latent 
print comparison: individualization (or identification), exclusion, or inconclusive” 
and that, “when a latent print examiner testifies that two impressions ‘match,’ 
they are communicating the notion that the prints could not possibly have come 
from two different individuals”). But cf. Guideline for the Articulation of the 
Decision-Making Process Leading to an Expert Opinion of Source Identification in 
Friction Ridge Examinations (draft), ORG. OF SCI. AREA COMMS. FOR FORENSIC SCI., 
at 9–10, https://perma.cc/F8SX-WGSY (PDF)  (providing that the examiner’s level 
of confidence in a fingerprint identification determination “shall not be reported 
in absolute terms and should not be reported numerically”). 
 149. See Danielle Weiss & Gerald Laporte, Uncertainty Ahead: A Shift in How 
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often perceive DNA evidence as iron-clad, indisputable evidence 
against the accused.150 Although DNA analysts will testify about 
the probability that a random individual’s DNA would match the 
sample DNA found at the crime scene or in another potentially 
incriminating location, these estimates do not take into account 
the chance that there was a mistake in the lab or that leaving DNA 
at the crime scene does not necessarily mean guilt.151 Further, 
these DNA experts’ probability statements are so significant that 
factfinders regularly consider them conclusive.152 This is in 
addition to decisionmakers regularly falling prey to the 
prosecutor’s fallacy, whereby they mistake the random match 
probability with the probability that the defendant is not guilty.153 
                                                                                                     
Federal Scientific Experts Can Testify, 279 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 1, 1 (2018) 
(explaining that, for decades, scientific experts have asserted that their expert 
opinions are to a “reasonable degree of scientific certainty”). 
 150.  See Kadane & Koehler, supra note 147, at 120–21. 
 151. See Meghan J. Ryan, The Privacy, Probability, and Political Pitfalls of 
Universal DNA Collection, 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 18 (2017); Meghan J. 
Ryan, Remedying Wrongful Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 274 n.89 
(2012) (“[W]hile DNA evidence can be ‘uniquely probative’ of a defendant’s 
innocence, it is not conclusive. For example, the defendant may not have left 
behind any of his DNA, and the trace DNA evidence examined could belong to his 
partner or an innocent individual.” (internal citations omitted)); Ryan & Adams, 
supra note 63, at 1083 (“Errors can still occur with respect to DNA 
evidence. . . . For example, laboratory tests can be mislabeled or contaminated, 
and an analyst could make a mistake or even possibly fabricate results.”); Ryan, 
supra note 145, at 430 (explaining that “there can be cross-contamination in the 
laboratory, the forensic scientist may err in running the samples or interpreting 
the results, or the forensic scientist may lie about the results”). Appropriate 
testimony on the part of the prosecutor would refer to “the probability of selecting 
the observed profile from a population of random unrelated individuals . . . based 
on the alleles present in [the] sample” rather than the “chance that the DNA 
profile came from someone else” or the “chance that a defendant is not guilty.” See 
BUTLER, supra note 129, at 251. The latter two approaches are known as the 
prosecutor’s fallacy. See id. (providing examples of the prosecutor’s fallacy, such 
as stating that “there is only a 1 in 15,000 chance that the defendant is not 
guilty”). 
 152.   See BUTLER, supra note 129, at 2 (“Thousands of cases have been closed 
with guilty suspects punished and innocent ones freed because of the power of a 
silent biological witness at the crime scene.”); Kadane & Koehler, supra note 147, 
at 120–21.  
 153.  See James S. Liebman et al., The Evidence of Things Not Seen: 
Non-Matches as Evidence of Innocence, 98 IOWA L. REV. 577, 615 (2013) 
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Prosecutors’ presentations of conviction program evidence as 
virtually infallible is especially troubling considering that 
arguably more is at stake with conviction programs. Unlike the 
prediction programs used to make bail, sentencing, and parole 
decisions, conviction programs affect determinations of guilt and 
innocence. In this regard, convicting an innocent person is often 
considered more concerning than imposing, for example, an 
inaccurate or unjust sentence.154 Bail, sentencing, and parole 
decisions are of course important. They affect who is detained and 
how severely an offender is punished. In this sense, they 
potentially affect an individual’s liberty and the stigma attached 
to detention and punishment severity. But they do not go to the 
heart of conviction. Certainly, unjust sentences are deeply 
undesirable, but a sentence that is too harsh is arguably not as 
terrible as wrongly convicting an innocent person.155 In this sense, 
decisions about conviction are more important than sentencing 
decisions.156 Similarly, a person who has been arrested and denied 
bail may have a more difficult time preparing for trial than 
someone who has not been denied bail, and this may negatively 
affect this individual’s probability of being convicted.157 But the 
                                                                                                     
(describing the prosecutor’s fallacy). 
 154.  This is debatable, and other commentators do not agree with me on this 
point. I think that wrongful conviction is a greater wrong than a sentence that is 
too harsh because, with wrongful conviction, the defendant is completely 
innocent, whereas, with too harsh of a sentence, the defendant is a wrongdoer and 
has run afoul of the law in some way. Still, certain defendants will almost 
certainly disagree with this point. To some defendants, especially guilty repeat 
offenders, the sentence is the most important aspect of a criminal proceeding. 
They have already committed the crime, and now they just want to do their time 
and get out. Regardless of whether wrongful conviction is a worse wrong than 
imposing too harsh of a punishment, though, wrongful conviction remains a 
problem and the computer programs that create risks of wrongful convictions are 
similarly problematic. 
 155. See supra note 154 (explaining this point further and noting that it is 
debatable). 
 156. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (noting that this is debatable 
and that acceptance of this proposition is not central to this Article’s thesis). 
 157.  See Melanie D. Wilson, The Price of Pretrial Release: Can We Afford to 
Keep Our Fourth Amendment Rights?, 92 IOWA L. REV. 159, 194 (2006) (“Because 
the judge’s decision to detain an arrested person has the capacity to alter her 
ability to prepare her case for trial and, thereby, impair a defendant’s fair-trial 
process, pretrial waivers used to gain pretrial freedom are important.”). 
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denial of bail likely does not have as great of an impact on 
conviction than, say, DNA evidence implicating the defendant. 
Indeed, DNA evidence, breathalyzer results, and fingerprint 
matches are ordinarily particularly damning evidence in a case.158 
One significant reason for this is that each of these types of 
evidence is often viewed as incredibly reliable and accurate, rooted 
in science, and providing valid, objective evidence of guilt.159 
IV. Accuracy and Secrecy Intertwined 
Although much is at stake where convictions are involved, and 
although prosecutors regularly present evidence produced by 
conviction programs as nearly indisputable, there are real 
questions about the accuracy of the outputs that these conviction 
programs produce and that prosecutors rely on so heavily today. 
                                                                                                     
 158.  See JOHN BUGLIOSI, THE ART OF PROSECUTION: TRIAL ADVOCACY 
FUNDAMENTALS FROM CASE PREPARATION THROUGH SUMMATION 12 (2000) (“DNA 
has surpassed fingerprints as the single most damning evidence in a criminal 
case.”); Aurora J. Wilson, Discovery of Breathalyzer Source Code in DUI 
Prosecutions, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 121, 122 (2011) (“Breathalyzer test 
results commonly provide critical evidence in cases involving charges for driving 
under the influence (DUI) or driving while intoxicated (DWI).”); Michael Specter, 
Do Fingerprints Lie?, NEW YORKER (May 19, 2002), https://perma.cc/CW8D-MS7X 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (explaining that the current culture is that, if “[y]ou 
are indicted on the basis of a fingerprint . . . [y]ou are [no longer] innocent till 
proven guilty” and that, “if the police have a print, you are assumed to be guilty”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 159.  See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 144, at 130 (“[D]NA typing is now 
universally recognized as the standard against which many other forensic 
individualization techniques are judged. DNA enjoys this preeminent position 
because of its reliability and the fact that, absent fraud or an error in labeling or 
handling, the probabilities of a false positive are quantifiable and often 
miniscule.”); BUGLIOSI, supra note 158, at 12; (describing DNA evidence as 
“damning evidence in a criminal case”); MURPHY, supra note 144, at 85 (stating 
that, with respect to DNA, “[m]any jurors, and even legal officials, hear the word 
match as synonymous with case closed”);  SHELTON, supra note 144, at 190 
(describing DNA evidence as “the new ‘gold standard’ of criminal identification 
techniques” because it has “a firm scientific foundation established outside of the 
context of criminal litigation”); Specter, supra note 158 (“For more than a century, 
the fingerprint has been regarded as an unassailable symbol of truth, particularly 
in the courtroom. When a trained expert tells a judge and jury that prints found 
at a crime scene match those of the accused, his testimony often decides the 
case.”). 
304 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 269 (2020) 
For the most part, simply more research must be done to determine 
whether these technologies produce accurate information on which 
convictions should fairly be based.160 Even if the developers of 
these technologies were aware of inaccurate outputs, or of potential 
inaccurate outputs, though, one wonders whether they would be 
forthcoming about such defects, knowing that such revelations 
could cause their revenues from these lucrative business products 
to plummet. In any case, the incredible secrecy surrounding use of 
these programs currently masks any answers that could be 
gleaned by more closely examining these technologies. Shielding 
these conviction programs from public—and even legal and 
scientific—scrutiny translates into a situation in which criminal 
defendants are being convicted based on evidence that has not 
been clearly established as accurate. Burgeoning secrecy in the law 
generally, and laypersons’ misunderstandings and acceptance of 
evidence presented as science, further exacerbate this concern of 
unchallenged evidence in criminal cases. 
A. The Interconnected Problems of Accuracy and Secrecy 
The accuracy of evidence presented at trial—especially that 
presented as “scientific” evidence—is important for the proper 
working of, and faith in, our criminal justice system.161 Where 
computerized programs used for conviction are concerned, there 
are significant questions about whether the programs’ outputs are 
accurate and useful figures on which legal decisionmakers should 
rely in assessing guilt and innocence. These questions about 
accuracy are difficult to resolve, as the details of the 
programs — the underlying algorithms and source codes—are 
generally kept under lock and key by the companies that created 
them and license them for government use in convicting criminal 
                                                                                                     
 160. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 14 (describing how the discipline of fingerprint 
matching is severely wanting for a scientific foundation and setting forth some 
necessary research that scientists and lawyers must conduct to shore up the 
practice). 
 161.  See id. (“Avoiding wrongful convictions—based on fingerprint or even 
other questionable evidence—is critical, but one should not overlook the 
importance of punishing guilty offenders. The legitimacy of criminal law depends 
on it.”).  
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defendants. This secrecy, paired with the pending accuracy 
questions, is incredibly problematic.  
1. Breathalyzers 
Breathalyzers are a common example of a mainstream 
technology for which there are real questions about accuracy. And 
the secrecy surrounding the technology, as well as judicial refusal 
to carefully examine whether breathalyzers produce valid 
readings, exacerbate these accuracy questions. In most 
jurisdictions today, defendants can be convicted of a driving-under-
the-influence (DUI) or driving-while-intoxicated (DWI) offense by 
simply blowing a certain value on a breathalyzer.162 This would 
constitute a per se violation of the relevant DUI or DWI statute.163 
Some reasons that jurisdictions have criminalized blowing certain 
breathalyzer values—rather than just allowing those values to 
serve as indirect evidence of blood alcohol concentration—relate to 
the relative ease with which officers can conduct breath tests in 
the field and the uncertainties surrounding conversions from 
breath alcohol levels to the blood alcohol levels that might 
otherwise be criminalized.164 Such conversions can depend upon a 
number of factors,165 making breathalyzer values less accurate at 
                                                                                                     
 162.  See Blood Alcohol Concentration Limits, supra note 117; see also People 
v. Bransford, 884 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1994) (“[T]he Legislature intended the statute 
to criminalize the act of driving either with the specified blood-alcohol level or 
with the specified breath-alcohol level.”). For example, California law provides 
that “[i]t is unlawful for a person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of 
alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle” and that this value “is based upon 
grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath.” CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152(b) (West 2019).  
 163.  See Blood Alcohol Concentration Limits, supra note 117 (“All 50 states 
and the District of Columbia have per se laws defining it as a crime to drive with 
a blood alcohol concentration . . . at or above a proscribed level, 0.08 percent.”). 
 164. See People v. Vangelder, 312 P.3d 1045, 1061 (Cal. 2013) (stating that 
the amendment to the California statute “of the per se offense (§ 23152(b)) was 
specifically designed to obviate the need for conversion of breath results into blood 
results—and it rendered irrelevant and inadmissible defense expert testimony 
regarding partition ratio variability among different individuals or at different 
times for the same individual”). 
 165.  See Bransford, 884 P.2d at 71 (“Many variables . . . can affect the actual 
ratio of an individual’s breath-alcohol concentration to blood-alcohol 
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determining whether a particular suspect has a certain blood 
alcohol concentration. Rather than requiring proof of one’s actual 
blood alcohol concentration in each case, it was a fairly simple 
legislative solution to criminalize particular breathalyzer readings 
in addition to blood alcohol concentrations.166  
Such absolute reliance on breathalyzers naturally makes the 
accuracy of breathalyzers significant. As a result, some defense 
lawyers in recent years have sought access to the source codes 
upon which these machines rely.167 As one defendant explained, in 
these types of cases, the only good defense “is to go after the testing 
method itself.”168 If the source codes contain errors, or the 
breathalyzer results are based on faulty algorithms, then the 
resulting alcohol concentrations will likely be inaccurate. And 
investigators have occasionally uncovered such errors. For 
example, one expert found defects in breathalyzers regularly used 
in New Jersey.169 Because the breathalyzer failed to properly store 
enough test values, it could report an inaccurate blood alcohol 
                                                                                                     
concentration. These variables include body temperature, atmospheric pressure, 
medical conditions, sex, and the precision of the measuring device.”). 
 166.  See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152 (West 2017 )(permitting prosecutors to 
establish illegal blood alcohol content based on “grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath”). 
 167.  See, e.g., State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 680–81 (Minn. 2009) 
(recounting the efforts of defense attorneys in two consolidated appeals to obtain 
source codes for the breathalyzers used in the underlying prosecutions).  
 168.  Id. at 685. 
 169.  See State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 157 (N.J. 2008) (explaining that one 
“expert . . . identified a significant flaw in the [breathalyzer] program’s source 
code that, in limited circumstances, can lead to an inaccurate reported BAC test 
result” and that, although an opposing expert “disputed many of the conclusions 
proffered by defendants’ experts, . . . he acknowledged and explained the buffer 
overflow defect, admitting that he was responsible for the inclusion of this error 
in the code”); see also Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 685 (explaining that one of the 
appellants submitted a report “analyz[ing] the New Jersey machine’s computer 
source code and uncover[ing] a variety of defects that could impact the test 
result”). Further, research shows that improper use of breathalyzers can lead to 
erroneous results. See Roth, supra 113, at 1999 (citing a report from the American 
Prosecutors Research Institute and offering the example that “an operator of a 
breath-alcohol machine who fails to wait long enough after a suspect vomits 
before commencing the test runs the risk that the machine will mistake residual 
mouth alcohol for alcohol in deep lung air and inaccurately estimate the suspect’s 
blood-alcohol level”). 
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concentration for a subject.170 If more information about the 
algorithms and source codes embedded in breathalyzer programs 
were released, experts would almost certainly uncover more errors. 
Such access to the underlying source codes and algorithms of 
breathalyzers is necessary to secure reliable determinations of 
guilt and innocence.171  
Despite this need for the program information that controls 
breathalyzers, courts have generally refused to grant defendants 
access to these algorithms and source codes. In many instances, 
states premise discovery on the government’s possession of the 
requested information.172 As states often simply license use of the 
proprietary technology from private companies, they lack this 
information embedded in the breathalyzer programs.173 In other 
states, courts condition discovery on the government having better 
access to the information than the defendant or on the prosecution 
making its “best efforts” to obtain the information.174 Courts have 
                                                                                                     
 170. See Chun, 943 A.2d at 157.  
 171. A number of states have limited breathalyzer results to those produced 
by machines that have been previously approved or have put other front-end 
protocols in place to improve accuracy and reliability. See Roth, supra note 113, 
at 2016 (“Many states now limit the type of machines that can be used and enforce 
operation protocols to ensure accurate results.”). 
 172.  See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01, subdiv. 2(1) (“On the defendant’s motion, 
the court for good cause must require the prosecutor . . . to assist the defendant 
in seeking access to specified matters relating to the case that are within the 
possession or control of an official or employee of any governmental agency, but 
not within the prosecutor’s control.”); see also Wilson, supra note 158, at 129 
(explaining that “the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure treat possession of 
requested evidence as dispositive for purposes of compliance with a motion for 
discovery”—that, “[i]n effect, if the prosecution does not possess or control the 
requested evidence, the government is not mandated to comply with the 
defendant’s discovery motion”—and that “[t]his interpretation of [the] Federal 
Rule[s] of Criminal Procedure . . . influences state court decisions in states where 
the rules of criminal procedure are derived from the federal rules”). 
 173.  Cf. Hills v. State, 663 S.E.2d 265, 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming the 
trial court’s denial of defendant’s discovery request for breathalyzer source code 
“because the state did not possess or control it”); Fargo v. Levine, 747 N.W.2d 130, 
135 (S.D. 2008) (“We affirm the district court’s judgment, concluding the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying [defendant's] motion to compel 
disclosure of the source code because [the defendant] failed to show Fargo had 
possession, custody or control of the code.”). 
 174.  See Wilson, supra note 158, at 131 (stating that, in Arizona, “the 
defendant must show that the State has ‘better access to the information’ and 
that the defense has made a ‘good faith effort to obtain the information without 
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applied these seemingly more liberal rules narrowly, however, and, 
again, have generally not allowed for defendants’ requested 
discovery in these cases.175 In still other states, courts have found 
the underlying source codes and algorithms either irrelevant to the 
cases at bar or have determined that defendants’ access to this 
information was outweighed by the program developers’ business 
interests.176 Accordingly, most defendants have been unsuccessful 
in obtaining the discovery necessary to effectively challenge 
breathalyzer results.177 
Although defendants are generally unsuccessful in obtaining 
access to information essential to assessing the accuracy of 
breathalyzers,178 one noteworthy case in which a defendant was 
successful in this regard is State v. Underdahl,179 which was 
litigated in the Minnesota Supreme Court.180 In that case, two 
                                                                                                     
success’” and that “the New York criminal procedure laws require the prosecution 
to make a ‘good faith effort’ to obtain material requested by the defendant even if 
the material is not within the prosecution’s possession, custody or control” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 175. See id.  
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. at 129–32 (explaining that even “states with seemingly flexible 
criminal procedure rules invariably arrive at a similar result as the majority: 
breathalyzer source code is generally not subject to discovery because it is not in 
the state’s possession, custody, or control, and the state is not better-positioned 
to acquire the proprietary information”). 
 178. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A Source of the 
Growing Controversy Over the Reliability of Automated Forensic Techniques, 66 
DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 100 (2016) (noting that, “[w]ith few exceptions, the clear 
majority of courts [have] rejected defendants’ requests that a defense expert be 
granted access to the [breathalyzer’s] source code”); Wilson, supra note 158, at 
123 (explaining that most courts refuse to grant defendants access to breathalyzer 
source code because this “source code is the proprietary information of the 
manufacturer and cannot therefore be in the possession, custody, or control of the 
State”). 
 179.  767 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 2009). 
 180. Underdahl is part of a morass of Minnesota cases relating to the 
discovery of breathalyzer source code. A Minnesota district court granted 
Underdahl discovery on May, 2, 2006, which was the genesis of this litigation, 
and which eventually resulted in a statewide examination of the accuracy and 
reliability of breathalyzer evidence in Minnesota. See In re Source Code 
Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d 525, 527 (Minn. 
2012) (“This appeal involves a statewide challenge to the reliability of Intoxilyzer 
5000EN test results based on alleged defects in the Intoxilyzer 5000EN source 
code.”); see also In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 2007) 
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defendants were separately charged with driving while intoxicated 
when their breathalyzer tests indicated blood alcohol 
concentrations181 of 0.23 and 0.18.182 Both defendants separately 
requested discovery of the breathalyzer’s source code.183 The 
district courts in both cases granted the defendants’ discovery 
requests, finding the source code relevant to the defendants’ guilt 
or innocence.184 On appeal, though, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed the district courts’ 
discovery orders.185 Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
recognized that the breathalyzer’s source code could very well be 
relevant in these cases,186 and it reinstated the district court’s 
order for discovery in one of the defendant’s cases.187 With respect 
to the other defendant, the court determined that the defendant 
had not made enough of a showing of relevance to justify the 
                                                                                                     
(denying the Commissioner of Public Safety’s request for a writ of prohibition to 
prevent the district court’s enforcement of its order to disclose the breathalyzer 
source code). By this time, “requests for discovery of the source code [had become] 
part of standard litigation strategy in criminal DWI and implied consent 
proceedings” in the state. In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied 
Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d at 529. Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
upheld the district court determination that the breathalyzer results were 
generally reliable. See id. at 528, 541–43; see also In re Source Code Evidentiary 
Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, No. 70-CR-09-19749, 2011 WL 803997 
(Minn. D. Ct. Mar. 08, 2011) (detailing the district court’s order). 
 181. The relevant statute does not specify whether the “alcohol concentration” 
measures blood or breath alcohol concentration. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169A.20 
(2017). 
 182. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 680. 
 183. See id.  
 184.  See id. at 680–81. The district courts not only granted the discovery 
requests, but they also ordered that, if the source code were not turned over within 
thirty days, the breathalyzer evidence would be excluded and, at least in one case, 
the charge would be dismissed. See id. 
 185. Id. at 681. 
 186.  See id. at 686 (“[W]e hold that the district court in [one defendant’s] case 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the source code may relate to his 
guilt or innocence.”). 
 187. See id. (finding that “the district court in [one of the defendant’s] case[s] 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the source code may relate to his 
guilt or innocence”). 
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discovery order.188 This is even though the facts of the 
cases — although not the requests for discovery—were similar.189 
Underdahl remains an outlier, and defendants generally 
cannot gain access to the algorithms and source codes underlying 
the computer program information propping up their 
convictions.190 Instead, the breathalyzer developers retain this 
closely held information. Preserving developers’ proprietary 
interests in the algorithms and source codes is thought to 
incentivize innovators to develop these types of technologies and 
support the competitiveness of the industry, but it weakens 
defendants’ abilities to defend themselves in court. Today, despite 
the opacity of their underlying algorithms and source codes, 
breathalyzer results remain powerful evidence in court.  
2. Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems 
Automated fingerprint identification systems constitute 
another genre of computer programs that helps prosecutors secure 
criminal convictions. An AFIS relies on its internal algorithms, 
and the computer source codes implementing those algorithms, to 
match latent prints from crime scenes to exemplar  
fingerprints—the known fingerprints on file.191 Contrary to how 
                                                                                                     
 188. See Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 685–86. Justices Alan Page and Paul 
Anderson concurred in part and dissented in part, objecting to the Supreme 
Court’s affirmance of the Court of Appeal’s reversal of the production order with 
respect to the second defendant, Dale Lee Underdahl. See id. at 687 – 88 (Page, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 189.  See id. at 680. In contrast to Underdahl’s discovery request, where he did 
not offer any information or exhibits supporting the motion, “Brunner submitted 
a memorandum and nine exhibits to support his request for the source code.” Id. 
at 685. One of Brunner’s exhibits “was the written testimony of . . . a computer 
science professor at the University of California in Berkeley, which explained the 
source code in voting machines, the source code’s importance in finding defects 
and problems in those machines, and the issues surrounding the source code’s 
disclosure.” Id. Another exhibit “detailed Brunner’s attempts to obtain the source 
code, both from the State and [the breathalyzer manufacturer].” Id. Yet another 
exhibit “was a copy of a report prepared on behalf of the defendants in New Jersey 
litigation about the reliability of New Jersey’s breath-test machine.” Id. 
 190. See Wilson, supra note 158, at 123.  
 191.  See generally NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK ch. 6, https://perma.cc/JC9T-5H2Z (PDF). 
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AFISs are depicted on television and in the movies, though, these 
programs do not actually exactly match prints. In fact, such perfect 
matches are nearly impossible, as any individual’s finger will print 
differently depending on the mechanics of touch and the properties 
of the surface touched.192 Instead, AFISs provide authorities with 
a number of possible matches, and human fingerprint examiners 
are the ones to actually declare matches and testify to them in 
court.193 The accuracy and reliability of AFISs remain important, 
however, because, as has recently become apparent, there are real 
questions about the abilities of fingerprint examiners to discern 
fingerprint matches from non-matches or inconclusive results.194 
It seems, then, that these examiners rely quite heavily on AFIS 
results, thus rendering AFIS conviction programs similar to 
breathalyzers in regularly fortifying criminal convictions. 
Despite the important role that AFISs play in the ultimate 
conviction of criminal defendants, experts know very little about 
the accuracy of AFISs. Outside of the companies developing these 
products and the government agencies purchasing or licensing the 
technology, very few individuals, if any, have raised the concern 
that these programs may not produce accurate results.195 In fact, 
                                                                                                     
 192. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 144, at 137. The National Academy 
of Sciences report explains that a number of factors contribute to fingerprint 
impressions, including: the “[c]ondition of the skin,” “[t]ype of residue,” 
“[m]echanics of touch,” “[n]ature of the surface touched,” “[d]evelopment 
technique,” “[c]apture technique,” and “[s]ize of the latent print or the percentage 
of the surface that is available for comparison.” Id. at 137–38. 
 193.  See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 191, at 6–27. 
 194.  See Specter, supra note 158. Notably, over half of the practicing or 
would-be fingerprint examiners who take the International Association of 
Identification’s certification test fail it. See Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, 
Error Rates for Human Latent Fingerprint Examiners, in AUTOMATIC 
FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 354 (Nalina Ratha & Ruud Bolle, eds.  2004) 
(noting “that about half the applicants for certification fail the test on the basis of 
poor fingerprint matching skills”); see also Andy Newman, Fingerprinting’s 
Reliability Draws Growing Court Challenges, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2001), 
https://perma.cc/AUB5-6JSV (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (“The accuracy of making 
identifications from dusted or latent prints, which are often smudged, distorted 
or fragmentary, has never been scientifically tested.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 195.  But cf. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 144, at 142–43 (“Although there 
is limited information about the accuracy and reliability of friction ridge analyses, 
claims that these analyses have zero error rates are not scientifically plausible.”). 
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it seems that accuracy is not necessarily the goal in AFIS 
functioning. Take the FBI’s current AFIS program, for example. 
While the FBI requests figures on the validity of these programs, 
neither its purchasing agents nor its fingerprint examiners are 
exactly sure how the program produces the possible matches that 
it generates.196 The FBI’s current program produces a handful of 
possible matches from the database for each latent fingerprint 
inputted into the system.197 It will produce these possible matches 
regardless of whether there is a 1% or a 99% similarity between 
the latent print and each of the closest “matches”198 in the 
database.199 The program does not produce any useful data for the 
user about how similar the internal database exemplar prints are 
to the inputted latent prints.200 While researchers have played 
with “similarity scores,” attempting to quantify how close alleged 
matches are, there is no consensus as to how to measure similarity, 
so similarity scores are just assessments of similarity according to 
a particular researcher’s, or programmer’s, own assessment of 
similarity.201 
After AFIS has generated a number of potential matches, the 
operator then turns over these results to a fingerprint examiner to 
determine with (alleged) certainty whether one of the 
program-produced “likely” exemplar prints actually matches the 
latent print.202 Again, the fingerprint examiner’s ability to do this 
                                                                                                     
 196.  See Interview with James Loudermilk, supra note 118; see also supra 
note 119 (noting that the FBI declined to comment).  
 197. See Interview with James Loudermilk, supra note 118. 
 198. The determination that these three prints are the closest matches to the 
latent print are according to the proprietary algorithm, the details of which 
remain secret.  See id.  
 199.  See id. 
 200.  See id.; see also infra note 205 (noting that a similarity score is “just ‘an 
artificial construct of the algorithm’”). 
 201.  See Ryan, supra note 14  (“[T]here are multiple ways to assess print 
similarity, depending on how that term is defined. The probability that prints 
share the same source . . . is a more complicated question.”).  
 202.  See supra note 193 and accompanying text. It is important to note that 
there are significant questions about the validity and reliability of fingerprint 
examiners’ determinations of fingerprint matches. Their methods are 
unscientific, and some studies have shown that their reliability is wanting. See 
Ryan, supra note 14; cf. 5 DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: 
THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 32.1 (2018) (“[S]urprisingly little 
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in an accurate and reliable manner remains questionable.203 
Further, the fingerprint examiner—who is the individual 
ultimately testifying in court—is generally unfamiliar with the 
AFIS technology providing him with a persuasive starting point 
for his analysis.204 Although AFIS provides the examiner with a 
limited number of possibilities for a match, the examiner is 
generally unaware of how the technology has chosen these 
particular fingerprints as the possible matches from the database, 
and he is also unaware of how similar the “likely” matches are.205 
Also like breathalyzers, AFISs are generally shrouded in 
secrecy. Again, the companies that develop these computer 
programs often do not want to release the details of their 
algorithms or underlying source codes because this would nullify 
their legal monopolies over the programs; it would hurt their 
business interests.206 Because this information is generally 
unavailable to the public, to criminal defendants, and even to the 
primary users of the program—law enforcement officers and 
fingerprint examiners—it seems that no defendants have ever 
challenged the matching programs on which their fingerprint 
matches are based. This lack of challenges may also result from 
the fact that, unlike breathalyzer evidence, AFIS matches are a 
step removed from prosecutors’ court cases against these 
                                                                                                     
conventional science exists to support the claims of the fingerprint examination 
community.”). Further, fingerprint examiners are generally not blinded from the 
already-developed facts of the case—from who the suspect is, how gruesome the 
crime was, the identity of the victim, etc.—making them susceptible to bias, 
whether conscious or unconscious. See Sue Russell, Bias and the Big Fingerprint 
Dust-Up, PAC. STANDARD (June 18, 2009), https://perma.cc/7S3R-D9TY (last 
updated Oct. 31, 2018) (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 203.  See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 204.  See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 14 (“[E]ven the FBI does not have access to 
the underlying algorithm and source code that produces the closest fingerprint 
matches . . . .”). 
 205.  See Interview with James Loudermilk, supra note 118; see also supra 
note 119 (noting that the FBI declined to comment). Although the program 
provides the user with similarity scores, these scores are just “an artificial 
construct of the algorithm”; similarity is assessed according to the secret 
algorithm’s own definition of “similarity.” Interview with James Loudermilk, 
supra note 118; supra notes 200–201 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Interview with James Loudermilk, supra note 118. 
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defendants. And even more basic challenges to fingerprint 
examiners’ match conclusions and resulting court testimony have 
been repeatedly shot down by courts across the nation.207 
Throughout history, not a single criminal defendant in the United 
States has found success in challenging the art of fingerprinting.208 
                                                                                                     
 207. See Ryan, supra note 14. 
 208.  In 2002, there was, briefly, a success story of a defendant having a 
fingerprint examiner’s expert testimony against him excluded. See Paul C. 
Giannelli, Fingerprints Challenged, 17 CRIM. JUST. 33, 33 (2002). In United States 
v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (withdrawn from bound 
volume), vacated and superseded by United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 
549 (E.D. Pa. 2002), Pennsylvania District Court Judge Louis H. Pollak initially 
determined that the fingerprint examiner’s testimony against the  
defendant—who was being tried on various “drug and murder charges,” Llera 
Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 550—was inadmissible. See Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 
2d at 517–18. The district court concluded that: 
The parties will be able to present expert fingerprint testimony (1) 
describing how any latent and rolled prints at issue in this case were 
obtained, (2) identifying, and placing before the jury, such fingerprints 
and any necessary magnifications, and (3) pointing out any observed 
similarities and differences between a particular latent print and a 
particular rolled print alleged by the government to be attributable to 
the same persons. But the parties will not be permitted to present 
testimony expressing an opinion of an expert witness that a particular 
latent print matches, or does not match, the rolled print of a particular 
person and hence is, or is not, the fingerprint of that person. 
Id. Judge Pollak reached his singular conclusion by carefully examining the 
details of this particular forensic science discipline and applying the controlling 
Daubert standard rather than just presuming that fingerprint examiner 
testimony was admissible because of its long historical pedigree. See id. at 
494–517. He determined that there was little, if any, scientific testing 
establishing the “reliability of fingerprints,” id. at 506–08 (“On the record made 
in Mitchell, the government had little success in identifying scientific testing that 
tended to establish the reliability of fingerprint identifications.”), that fingerprint 
examination “had not been sufficiently subjected to the peer review [and 
publication] process,” Ryan, supra note 14; see also Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 
at 508–09 (noting that any publications had not truly been subjected to scientific 
scrutiny and stating that “[i]t would . . . be a misnomer to call fingerprint 
examiners a ‘scientific community’ in the Daubert sense), and that fingerprint 
identifications further failed the next Daubert factor considering “the known or 
potential rate of error . . . and the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique’s operation,” see Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 509–14. 
While fingerprint identifications are generally accepted, the district court 
explained that “the failure of fingerprint identifications fully to satisfy the first 
three Daubert factors militates against heavy reliance on the general acceptance 
factor,” id. at 515, and that general acceptance cannot “by itself . . . sustain the 
government’s burden in making the case for the admissibility of fingerprint 
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3. Probabilistic Genotyping Systems 
As with breathalyzers, AFISs, and other technologies, there 
are real concerns about the accuracy of PGSs like TrueAllele and 
STRmix. In 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science 
and Technology (PCAST) reviewed the use of forensic sciences in 
the United States, including PGSs such as TrueAllele and 
STRmix.209 Although PCAST recognized that these approaches to 
                                                                                                     
testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.” Id. This radical skeptical view of 
fingerprint identifications “sent reverberations across the criminal justice 
community—but not for long.” Ryan, supra note 14.  Judge Pollak reversed his 
decision just two months later. See Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, vacating and 
superseding Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (withdrawn from bound volume); 
Ryan, supra note 14. He “explained that, upon reconsideration, it seemed that, 
although fingerprint examination is not scientific, it is a technical discipline and, 
in that sense, there has been sufficient peer review and publication and sufficient 
knowledge of error rate and maintenance of standards under Daubert.” Ryan, 
supra note 14; see Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 571. “The ‘testing’ factor of 
Daubert was still not met, but this, the court determined, would not prevent the 
admissibility of testimony on fingerprint identifications.” Ryan, supra note 14; see 
Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 571–72. Judge Pollak explained that, “[t]o 
postpone present in-court utilization of this ‘bedrock forensic identifier’ pending 
such [useful] research would be to make the best the enemy of the good.” Llera 
Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 572. This “was the end of the brief victory by criminal 
defendants over the questionable practice of admitting ‘expert’ testimony on 
fingerprint identifications.” Ryan, supra note 14. As I have explained elsewhere, 
“[s]ince Judge Pollak’s brave analysis in his initial opinion carefully analyzing the 
forensic discipline under Daubert, there have been no other even slightly 
successful challenges to this evidence in court.” Id. Instead, “[j]udges seem to have 
taken a uniform stance in admitting this evidence despite the questions about the 
accuracy and reliability of the human fingerprint examiners and the [opaque] 
AFISs on which they rely as important starting points for their examinations.” 
Id. Without much success challenging fingerprint evidence in general, there has 
been little incentive for defendants to broaden their challenges to include access 
to the algorithms and source codes underlying AFIS results that contribute to 
fingerprint examiners’ analyses.  
 209.  See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF 
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (Sept. 2016), https://perma.cc/A7EF-2NJC (PDF) 
(reviewing forensic science methods as used in U.S. Courts, including examining 
the uses of PGSs). This goes hand-in-hand with the FBI’s recent notice to 
laboratories that federal data they had been using in calculating probabilities as 
related to DNA mixtures was erroneous. See Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Notifies Crime 
Labs of Errors Used in DNA Match Calculations Since 1999, WASH. POST (May 
29, 2015), https://perma.cc/8FFH-949L (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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analyzing DNA mixtures are an improvement over more subjective 
methods of analyzing mixtures—methods that require examiners 
to make assumptions about which alleles to include and exclude in 
the probability calculations—it also expressed concerns about 
blindly relying on these computer-based approaches.210 PCAST 
explained: 
These probabilistic genotyping software programs clearly 
represent a major improvement over purely subjective 
interpretation. However, they still require careful scrutiny to 
determine (1) whether the methods are scientifically valid, 
including defining the limitations on their reliability (that is, 
the circumstances in which they may yield unreliable results) 
and (2) whether the software correctly implements the methods. 
This is particularly important because the programs employ 
different mathematical algorithms and can yield different 
results for the same mixture profile.211 
PCAST’s concern about accuracy is very real. TrueAllele and 
STRmix have produced conflicting results in certain cases.212 In 
New York v. Hillary,213 for example, TrueAllele results suggested 
that defendant Hillary was not at the murder scene, whereas 
STRmix results placed him there.214 Further, experts found a 
coding error in the STRmix software in the midst of a criminal trial 
in New Zealand.215 This important observation likely would have 
                                                                                                     
 210. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 209, 
at 79.  
 211.  Id.  
 212.  See Augenstein, supra note 9; Kirchner, supra note 42. 
 213. No. 2015-15 (St. Lawrence County Aug. 26, 2016). 
 214.  See Augenstein, supra note 9. 
 215. See Kirchner, supra note 42; David Murray, Queensland Authorities 
Confirm ‘Miscode’ Affects DNA Evidence in Criminal Cases, THE COURIER-MAIL, 
(Mar. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/6RLC-SN72 (last visited Jan. 21, 2020) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also STATEMENT RELATING TO 
STRMIX™ MISCODES, FRIDAY, 18 MARCH 2016, https://perma.cc/53X8-PJ4R (PDF) 
(announcing the coding error); see also Roth, supra note 113, at 2024–25 (stating 
that “[STRmix’s] creators have had to disclose publicly multiple episodes of 
miscodes potentially affecting match statistics”). Perhaps suggesting similar 
problems, “TrueAllele’s creator Mark Perlin has executed over twenty-five 
revisions to its 170,000+ lines of source code, with no published documentation as 
to what has been revised or why.” Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 
1245, 1273 (2016); see also Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. 
L. REV. 659, 681 (2018) (suggesting that these changes may have “corrected 
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gone unnoticed if the underlying source code and algorithm had 
remained entirely secret. These examples raise the very serious 
question about which results, if any, should be trusted. 
Despite different PGSs producing conflicting results, the 
creators of these programs still tout the programs’ accuracy and 
usefulness. Cybergenetics founder and creator of TrueAllele, Mark 
Perlin, boasts about the improved accuracy of his program over 
traditional DNA analyses216 and claims that TrueAllele “is 
validated to [the level of] five [DNA mixture] contributors in 
various scientific publications.”217 Importantly, though, the studies 
and reviews justifying this claim of accuracy were conducted by 
Cybergenetics or its shareholders.218 As the lead author on one of 
these studies, for example, Perlin disclosed that he “is a 
shareholder, officer and employee of Cybergenetics . . . [which] 
manufactures the patented TrueAllele® Casework system, and 
provides expert testimony about DNA case results.”219 The second 
and third authors on the article were also at the time “current or 
former employees of Cybergenetics.”220 This is a clear conflict of 
interest. Perlin’s claims of program accuracy are not unique, 
                                                                                                     
undisclosed errors or inadvertently introduced new ones”). 
 216. See Augenstein, supra note 9. This is not inconsistent with the PCAST 
report, which similarly stated that “[t]hese probabilistic genotyping software 
programs clearly represent a major improvement over purely subjective 
interpretation.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 
209, at 79. 
 217.  Augenstein, supra note 9. According to Perlin, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) “pretends” that TrueAllele must be further 
validated or that “there is a problem” with TrueAllele in order to secure funding 
for the organization. Id. He has further argued that NIST is “biased and lack[s] 
expertise.” Id. As for PCAST, Perlin has suggested that the “report is 
well-intentioned, but misguided,” and that “[f]orensics needs better science, not 
more bureaucracy.” Id. 
 218. See id.; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra 
note 209, at 80 (“[M]ost of the studies evaluating software packages have been 
undertaken by the software developers themselves.”). But see Imwinkelried, 
supra note 178, at 121 (suggesting that the number of validation studies 
demonstrating the accuracy of the TrueAllele software is sufficient, at least when 
the software is used under certain conditions). 
 219.  Mark W. Perlin et al., TrueAllele Casework on Virginia DNA Mixture 
Evidence: Computer and Manual Interpretation in 72 Reported Criminal Cases, 9 
PLOS ONE 3, 1 (2014). 
 220. Id. 
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though. STRmix developer John Buckleton has similarly argued 
that his program is well validated and that PCAST reached 
improper conclusions based on inadequate research.221 PCAST has 
explained that, although “[a] number of papers have been 
published that analyze known mixtures in order to address 
[accuracy and related concerns],” several points must be made.222 
“First, most of the studies evaluating [these] software packages 
have been undertaken by the software developers themselves. 
While it is completely appropriate for method developers to 
evaluate their own methods, establishing scientific validity also 
requires scientific evaluation by other scientific groups that did not 
develop the method.”223 PCAST  also pointed out that “there have 
been few comparative studies across the methods to evaluate the 
differences among them” and the few that have been conducted 
were not by uninterested, independent groups.224 “Most 
importantly,” PCAST explained: 
[C]urrent studies have adequately explored only a limited range 
of mixture types (with respect to number of contributors, ratio 
of minor contributors, and total amount of DNA). The two most 
widely used methods (STRMix and TrueAllele) appear to be 
reliable within a certain range, based on the available evidence 
and the inherent difficulty of the problem. Specifically, these 
methods appear to be reliable for three-person mixtures in 
which the minor contributor constitutes at least 20 percent of 
the intact DNA in the mixture and in which the DNA amount 
exceeds the minimum level required for the method. . . . For 
more complex mixtures (e.g. more contributors or lower 
proportions), there is relatively little published evidence. In 
human molecular genetics, an experimental validation of an 
important diagnostic method would typically involve hundreds 
of distinct samples.225  
                                                                                                     
 221. See Augenstein, supra note 9. In response to the PCAST report, 
Buckleton provided PCAST with a list of publications validating STRmix. See id. 
As with TrueAllele, these publications were authored by individuals with a 
financial interest in the technology.  
 222.  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 209, at  
80–81. 
 223.  Id. at 80. 
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. at 80–81. The report further stated that “[o]ne forensic scientist told 
PCAST that many more distinct samples have, in fact, been analyzed, but that 
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TrueAllele and STRmix continue to maintain, though, that their 
technologies are validated for analyzing more than three-person 
mixtures,226 and forensic scientists regularly use these programs 
on these more complex mixtures. 
One of the primary reasons that experts have not investigated 
the accuracy of PGSs more thoroughly is that the developers of 
these programs have vigilantly guarded their programs as trade 
secrets. As with other creators of conviction programs, PGS 
developers like Cybergenetics and Buckleton claim that secrecy is 
necessary to preserve their property rights.227 Indeed, if the source 
code or algorithm were made public, the program would become 
vulnerable to copycats that could purloin market share. Because of 
this secrecy, researchers have difficulty gaining access to the 
algorithms and source codes that could inform accuracy 
determinations.228 Further, because licensing the programs is 
expensive, it is difficult for researchers to even engage in 
validation exercises that could be useful for assessing accuracy.  
Not only does this secrecy make it difficult for researchers to 
examine PGSs, but it makes it nearly impossible for criminal 
defendants and their attorneys to challenge this evidence when 
prosecutors present it in court. As commentators have explained, 
“[w]ithout the programming code, defense attorneys are unable to 
                                                                                                     
the data have not yet been collated and published.” Id. at 81. PCAST then urged 
forensic scientists and scientific journals to work together “to publish high-quality 
validation studies that properly establish the range of reliability of methods for 
the analysis of complex DNA mixtures.” Id. PCAST explained that this is 
necessary “[b]ecause empirical evidence is essential for establishing the 
foundational validity of a method.” Id. 
 226.  See Augenstein, supra note 9. 
 227.  See Dang, supra note 137. Cybergenetics has consistently refused to 
reveal its source code or details about its algorithm, and judges have also refused 
to order discovery here. See Kirchner, supra note 42 (“Defendants’ requests to get 
access to TrueAllele’s source code have consistently been denied, leading the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center, an advocacy group, to kick off a FOIA 
campaign to obtain whatever information is publicly available from the 
jurisdictions that use it.”). Professor Natalie Ram stated that, at least as of 2018, 
“no one outside of Perlin’s company has seen or examined TrueAllele’s source 
code.” Ram, supra note 215, at 677. 
 228.  Cf. Dang, supra note 137 (“[W]ithout the code, there is no way of verifying 
that True Allele is as accurate as Cybergenetics claims.”). 
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challenge the accuracy of TrueAllele” and other PGSs.229 
“Likewise, prosecutors can’t authenticate it.”230 The same is true 
with respect to the appropriateness of the underlying algorithm.  
This concern that secrecy leaves defense attorneys unable to 
challenge the accuracy of a program like TrueAllele was the claim 
made by Michael Robinson, a man on trial for murder in 
Pennsylvania in 2013.231 Part of the evidence against Robinson 
was a match to his DNA found on a bandana near the crime 
scene.232 Examiners cultivated this DNA evidence by analyzing the 
complex sample with TrueAllele.233 The results were staggering 
and damning: The TrueAllele analysis determined that the DNA 
found on the bandana “was 5.6 billion times more likely” to have 
come from Robinson than from another individual.234 And the 
punishment facing Robinson if convicted—the death 
penalty — exacerbated the devastating nature of the probability 
determination.235 During the course of Robinson’s defense, his 
counsel requested access to the source code underlying TrueAllele, 
claiming that, “without production and defense review of the 
computer instructions, not only will the petitioner be denied his 
constitutional right to a fair trial—he risks being wrongly 
executed.”236 Defense counsel explained that having access to the 
source code was essential for cross-examining Mark Perlin, 
                                                                                                     
 229.  Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See Seth Augenstein, Access Denied: Source Code for DNA Software 
Remains Protected in Pa. Murder Trial, FORENSIC MAG. (Feb. 5, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/G8TV-MRBG (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 232.  See id.; Dang, supra note 137. 
 233. See Augenstein, supra note 231; Dang, supra note 137. 
 234.  Dang, supra note 137 (“TrueAllele found that the DNA was 5.6 billion 
times more likely to belong to Robinson than to another suspect.”); Paula Reed 
Ward, Attorneys Ask Superior Court to Take Up DNA Issue, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 8, 2016 (“Dr. Perlin said the DNA was 5.6 billion times more 
likely to belong to Mr. Robinson.”). The TrueAllele analysis actually initially 
produced a probability of one in 2 billion, but, after a software upgrade to the 
program, it generated the one in 5.6 billion probability figure. See id. 
 235. See Dang, supra note 137 (“If Robinson is convicted, he faces the death 
penalty.”). 
 236.  Id.  
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TrueAllele’s developer.237 The district court was unpersuaded by 
this argument, though, and denied the discovery request.238 The 
court stated that “[a]n order requiring Cybergenetics to produce 
the source code would be unreasonable, as release would have the 
potential to cause great harm to Cybergenetics.”239 Indeed, 
Cybergenetics could lose a lot of money to competitors if it made 
the source code public.  
Commercial PGS developers have generally sought to protect 
their creations through secrecy, and many courts have granted 
them this sphere of secrecy with respect to the programs’ 
algorithms and source codes.240 Some courts have granted limited 
access to this information in some circumstances, although these 
orders have rarely endured.241 For example, in March of 2018, a 
                                                                                                     
 237. See id.  
 238.  See Augenstein, supra note 231; Dang, supra note 137. 
 239. Dang, supra note 137. 
 240.  Some non-commercial developers make their source codes publicly 
available, allowing researchers to modify and use their codes. See Kirchner, supra 
note 42. As Lauren Kirchner has reported: 
Some makers of probabilistic genotyping software allow other 
programmers to use and modify their code. LRmix, software created by 
a pair of scientists in the Netherlands, EuroForMix, created by a 
Norwegian team, and Lab Retriever, a non-commercial program 
available under the Creative Commons license and uploaded to 
GitHub, are among the free, open-source tools available.  
Beyond offering transparency, this approach can help expose problems. 
A significant bug was discovered and fixed in LikeLTD, an open-source 
Australian probabilistic genotyping program, because of outside 
scrutiny. 
Id. 
 241.  As Professor Natalie Ram explained, as of 2018, “only one American 
court ha[d] compelled production of the source code for probabilistic genotyping 
software in a criminal case.” Ram, supra note 215, at 678; see also Imwinkelried, 
supra note 178, at 101 (“The courts’ responses to requests for the source code of 
TrueAllele has been even more uniformly negative than the previous requests for 
access to the source codes of infrared breath testing instruments.”). And the 
software at issue in that case was not developed by the commercial sector but was 
instead created by New York City’s crime lab. See Lauren Kirchner, Federal 
Judge Unseals New York Crime Lab’s Software for Analyzing DNA Evidence, 
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/4JJF-2JZT (last visited Jan. 21, 
2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Experts had already 
questioned the validity of FST’s design, but, after a judge ordered disclosure of 
the software’s source code, one reviewing (defense) expert “found that the 
program dropped valuable data from its calculations, in ways that users wouldn’t 
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San Diego Superior Court judge ruled that prosecutors were 
required to turn over STRmix’s software and source code to defense 
counsel,242 but  the California Court of Appeals reversed this order 
just a few months later.243 Aside from court orders, certain 
developers like Buckleton have made their source codes available 
to defense counsel on a limited basis.244 Such limited access could 
require defense counsel to sign confidentiality and non-disclosure 
agreements, though.245 This could have the effect of limiting 
counsel from critiquing the workings or accuracy of the program in 
open court.246 Less forthcoming, Cybergenetics provides 
preliminary DNA results to law enforcement (as well as to defense 
counsel) on a complimentary basis, charging the client for only a 
full report that could be used as evidence at trial.247 
                                                                                                     
necessarily be aware of, but that could unpredictably affect the likelihood 
assigned to the defendant’s DNA being in the mixture.” Lauren Kirchner, Traces 
of Crime: How New York’s DNA Techniques Became Tainted, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 
2017), https://perma.cc/DPN6-YMVZ (last visited Jan. 21, 2020) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). The expert concluded: “‘I did not leave with 
the impression that FST was developed by an experienced software development 
team,’” and that, “[p]ending more rigorous testing, ‘the correctness of the behavior 
of the FST software should be seriously questioned.’” Id. Faced with these 
concerns, the U.S. Attorney’s office withdrew the relevant DNA evidence against 
the defendant prior to the admissibility hearing. See id.  
 242.  See Greg Moran, DA Fights Judge’s Order to Hand Over Info on How 
New DNA Test Works, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 16, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/25GS-8RMP (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 243.  See People v. Superior Court, 239 Ca. Rptr. 3d 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). 
 244. See Moran, supra note 242; Kevin Petroff, The Changing State of DNA 
Analysis, 46 TEX. PROSEC. (July–Aug. 2016), https://perma.cc/6QR7-V8AQ (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2020) (explaining that, although there are certainly “some 
differences between [STRmix and TrueAllele], the biggest issue . . . is that the 
STRmix creator is willing to share the ‘source code,’ or the ingredients of the 
program, with the State or the defense if requested in a case,” while, “[a]t this 
time, TrueAllele is refusing to provide that information”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 245.  See Moran, supra note 242. 
 246. See id. 
 247. See Kirchner, supra note 42 (“[Cybergenetics] offers to take on [the] most 
difficult DNA cases and provides preliminary results for free. . . . [C]ustomers 
only pay at the point at which they want Cybergenetics to run a complete analysis 
and write a report about the results that can be used at trial.”).  
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Despite these concerns about accuracy and reliability, and 
despite regularly being held secret, which heightens the validity 
concerns, TrueAllele is used by crime labs in Virginia, Baltimore, 
Kern County (CA), Beaufort County (SC), and Richland County 
(SC).248 STRmix is used by the FBI and U.S. Army, as well as labs 
in New York, California, and Texas.249  
B. Burgeoning Secrecy in the Law 
Secrecy has become a problem throughout the law250 and is 
especially troubling in the context of using computer programs in 
the criminal justice system. Most often, criminal defendants do not 
have access to the algorithms and source codes that criminal 
justice system actors rely on in making impactful decisions about 
these defendants’ lives.251 In fact, it seems that even the 
individuals wielding these programs—from police officers to 
prosecutors to judges—do not have access to the details of the 
programs upon which these important decisions are made.252 
Moreover, even if these actors did have access to the relevant 
algorithms and source codes, they probably would not understand 
their nuances,253 as doing so would ordinarily require an 
understanding of the applicable database, expertise in computer 
science, and a background of conducting social or natural science 
                                                                                                     
 248.  See id. 
 249. See id.; Petroff, supra note 244.  
 250. See, e.g., William W. Berry & Meghan J. Ryan, Cruel Techniques, 
Unusual Secrets, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 405 (2017) (describing the problems of 
secrecy surrounding lethal injection procedures under the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments). 
 251.  See supra Part III. 
 252.  See supra Parts III–IV. 
 253.  See Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1166 (“The nature of algorithms further 
obscures the process, except perhaps to technical experts.”). 
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research.254 As one might imagine, most criminal justice actors 
lack these proficiencies.255 
One of the reasons that these algorithms and source codes are 
kept secret is that outside companies have created them and rely 
on this secrecy to make profits; the algorithms and source codes 
are proprietary in nature. Northpointe’s COMPAS would not be 
nearly as lucrative if its algorithm or source code were made public 
and others could profit off of its research and development 
investments. The same is true with respect to TrueAllele and other 
technologies that the government uses to secure convictions. The 
intricacies of intellectual property law exacerbate what has become 
a secrecy problem in this arena.256 In recent years it has become 
more difficult to obtain effective patents on algorithms, pushing 
businesses to heighten the secrecy surrounding their inventions 
and operations rather than disclose information in exchange for a 
temporary monopoly on the technology by way of patent law.257 
This is one factor that has contributed to the rise of secrecy in the 
realm of government conviction programs. 
But the secrecy surrounding the workings of technologies like 
breathalyzers, AFISs, and PGSs is not entirely novel within the 
criminal justice sphere. For example, in the area of lethal injection 
there has also been a marked increase in secrecy as states have 
had to experiment with a variety of drug cocktails to carry out 
executions because European drug manufacturers have refused to 
sell their drugs to buyers intending to use them to execute 
                                                                                                     
 254. Cf. id. (stating that “the technical complexity of [automated predictive 
technologies’ designs] makes it nearly impossible for outsiders to determine the 
accuracy, effectiveness, or fairness of the program” and explaining that, in the 
context of predictive policing algorithms, although government actors “receive the 
results, . . . due to the complexity of the chosen algorithm they can rarely 
understand the underlying math”).  
 255.  Cf. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEFENSE LAWYERS, GIDEON AT 50: A THREE-PART 
EXAMINATION OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN AMERICA 9 (Oct. 2016) (examining the sorry 
state of indigent defense in the United States today). 
 256.  For a more detailed account of the intersection of intellectual property 
and secret conviction programs, see Meghan J. Ryan, Secret Algorithms, IP 
Rights, and the Public Interest (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 257.  See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (limiting 
businesses’ abilities to obtain patents on computer software); see also Ryan, supra 
note 256 (examining the interaction between intellectual property law and the 
burgeoning secrecy in public law fields like criminal law and procedure). 
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individuals.258 In many instances, they have refused to disclose the 
combinations of drugs to be used for execution, the dosages to be 
used, and the drug suppliers.259 This is in addition to the long 
history of secrecy about the identity of the executioners and the 
limitations on the numbers of individuals who may observe 
executions.260 Some litigants have objected to this secrecy, but they 
have generally been unsuccessful due to the limitations of due 
process and the confines of the particular procedural postures in 
which these matters are raised.261 Secrecy is also prevalent in the 
                                                                                                     
 258. See Berry & Ryan, supra note 250, at 422 (“[S]ecrecy has increasingly 
crept into lethal injection executions. Today, state governments shroud modern 
executions with multiple levels of secrecy, a disturbing notion in an open, 
democratic society.”); see also Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth 
Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1380–83 (2014) (chronicling states’ 
“increasingly creative and legally dubious steps to procure drugs for their 
execution procedures”). 
 259. See Berry & Ryan, supra note 250, at 423 (“In many cases, states have 
elected to keep the identity of the new drugs secret, as well as the names of the 
drug manufacturers.”). 
 260.  See id. (noting that the recent rise in secrecy around lethal injection 
protocols “complements states’ traditional determinations to keep the identities 
of executioners secret” and explaining that, “[n]ot only have executions 
transitioned from the public to the private sphere, leaving most Americans 
without the experience of watching someone die by lethal injection or firing squad, 
but also gaining any access to the details of these executions is exceedingly 
difficult, if not impossible”). There is at least one additional layer of secrecy with 
respect to lethal injections. Id. at 406. This stems from the government’s use of a 
paralytic to hide the corporal writhing that would likely otherwise be observed as 
the death row offender is being put to death. See id. There seems to be no clinical 
reason for this paralytic, which actually complicates the execution process by 
making it more difficult to determine whether the offender has been sufficiently 
sedated before he is killed. See Brief for Petitioners at 52, Baze v. Rees, No. 
07-5439, 2007 WL 3307732 (Nov. 5, 2007) (stating that “[i]t is undisputed that 
pancuronium is not a necessary component of the execution procedure” and 
pointing out that the lower court “concluded that the ‘use of pancuronium in 
Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol serves no therapeutic purpose’” (internal 
alterations omitted)); Gregory D. Curfman et al., Physicians and Execution, 358 
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 403, 403 (2008) (“The use of a neuromuscular blocker, 
pancuronium bromide, as part of the protocol has been especially controversial, 
since it has no anesthetic properties and only paralyzes the person, which can 
mask inadequate anesthesia if a sufficient dose of sodium thiopental has not been 
administered.”). 
 261.  See Berger, supra note 258, at 1392 (“The majority of courts, especially 
federal appellate courts, have permitted states to keep secret important details 
from their lethal injection procedures.”). In Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413 
(5th Cir. 2013), for instance, the Fifth Circuit, rejecting the death row plaintiff’s 
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area of government surveillance. After the terrorist attack on 
September 11, 2001, and Congress’s enactment of the USA Patriot 
Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) 
began issuing significantly broader secret subpoenas requiring 
internet and telecommunications companies to surrender 
customers’ personal data, browsing data, and details of their 
conversations.262 It also “began issuing ground-breaking secret 
legal interpretations that allowed mass surveillance.”263 All of this 
was done in the name of national security.264 Further, secrecy 
abounds in terms of how the government obtains information to be 
used against any particular defendant. As a result of the 
“increasingly prevalent doctrine of ‘collective knowledge,’” which 
means that one officer’s knowledge is imputed to other officers, 
individual police officers can possess the necessary “reasonable 
suspicion” to take actions in an effort to obtain evidence against a 
suspect.265 This allows police officers to obtain the information that 
facilitates “parallel construction” in a case;266 it enables the police 
to obtain information from a secret source and then suggest that 
the information came from another line of investigation.267 All of 
                                                                                                     
request that the state disclose the details of the execution protocol, concluded that 
“[t]here is no violation of the Due Process Clause from the uncertainty that 
Louisiana has imposed on Sepulvado by withholding the details of its execution 
protocol.” Id. at 420. Provocatively, the court conceded that “[p]erhaps the state’s 
secrecy masks ‘a substantial risk of serious harm’” stemming from the protocol, 
“but,” the court furthered, “it does not create one.” Id. Defending its position, the 
court pronounced that “[c]ourts are not supposed to function as ‘boards of inquiry 
charged with determining best practices.’” Id. at 419 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 
U.S. 35, 51 (2008) (plurality opinion)). 
 262.  See US Foreign Intelligence Court Did Not Deny Any Surveillance 
Requests Last Year, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/6FMZ-GSVT 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (discussing developments in government surveillance 
in the post 9/11 era) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 263.  ELIZABETH GOITEIN, THE NEW ERA OF SECRET LAW 6, 15 (2016),  
https://perma.cc/HY6K-D3FW (PDF). 
 264. See id.  
 265.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARK SIDE: SECRET ORIGINS OF EVIDENCE IN US 
CRIMINAL CASES 37 (Jan. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/C5N2-CCYE (last visited Oct. 
16, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 266. Id.  
 267. See id. (“Through a practice known as parallel construction, an official 
who wishes to keep an investigative activity hidden from courts and 
defendants—and ultimately from the public—can simply go through the motions 
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this obscures the true source of information against the defendant. 
It has been defended as protecting the identities of vulnerable 
confidential informants, though. 
Whereas courts upholding the secrecy in these other contexts 
have relied on the limitations of constitutional commands, the 
confines of particular procedural postures, national security, and 
protecting informants, courts upholding the secrecy in the 
conviction algorithm context—at least to the extent that they have 
been faced by these questions—have relied on the business 
interests of the companies that developed the computer programs. 
As the judge in the Robinson case268 stated, “[a]n order requiring 
Cybergenetics to produce the source code would be unreasonable, 
as release would have the potential to cause great harm to 
Cybergenetics.”269 This is a questionable position when you 
reframe the issue as one weighing the importance of accuracy in 
criminal convictions against the importance of maintaining the 
secrecy of technologies that the government has licensed to secure 
convictions. This is not to suggest that the technology companies 
should necessarily be required to publish the details of their 
conviction programs, but perhaps there should be limitations on 
the technologies that the government may use in convicting 
individuals—especially when there are serious questions about the 
accuracy and reliability of those technologies. Secrecy poses a 
significant hurdle with respect to probing these questions of 
accuracy and reliability. 
C. Lay Acceptance and (Mis)Understanding of Science and 
Technology 
Intertwined with the motivations for secrecy is the general 
lack of understanding of science and technology among lawyers. 
Many lawyers have little understanding of science and the 
intricacies of technology.270 Like many Americans, most lawyers 
                                                                                                     
of re-discovering evidence in some other way.” (internal quotations omitted)).  
 268. See supra notes 231–239 and accompanying text.  
 269.  Dang, supra note 137. 
 270. See Garrett M. Graff, Government Lawyers Don’t Understand the 
Internet. That’s a Problem, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2016, 11:48 AM), 
328 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 269 (2020) 
rely heavily on technology in their everyday lives with the use of 
the internet, smartphones, and other gadgets. And in their law 
practices, attorneys often rely on technology when working on 
matters such as electronic discovery and DNA evidence. With this 
heavy reliance on science and technology, but with little 
understanding of it, the useful results in some ways seem like 
magic.271 Consumers of science and technology generally lack 
understanding of the limits of science and technology. The same is 
true with computer programs and their underlying algorithms and 
source codes. Players within the criminal justice system frequently 
rely on these programs, but they generally lack enough 
understanding to fully comprehend the programs’ limitations.272 
Instead, like much science and technology that Americans 
regularly encounter, criminal justice actors blindly trust these 
products because they are in fact the products of science and 
technology.273 This trusted view of science and technology within 
our system has become pervasive. Indeed, one commentator has 
                                                                                                     
https://perma.cc/WMM4-5MUD (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) (“Both federal 
prosecutors and the attorneys who represent executive agencies in court are 
bungling lawsuits across the country because they don’t understand what they’re 
talking about. Too few lawyers have the skill set or the specialized knowledge to 
make sense of code, networks and the people who use them . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also James Podgers, Lawyers Still Have a 
Lot to Learn About Technology, Ethics 20/20 Witnesses Say, ABA J. (Feb. 3, 2012, 
2:12 AM), https://perma.cc/4E2P-46BU (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) (“Lawyers don’t 
fully appreciate how much technology is changing the nature of law practice, 
several witnesses said today at a public hearing conducted by the ABA 
Commission on Ethics 20/20.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Ryan & Adams, supra note 63, at 1080 (stating that “the problems with 
[reliability in various] areas of forensic science are exacerbated by generally poor 
scientific understanding within the legal community, which has led many to 
ascribe undue value to dubious evidence”). 
 271.  See ARTHUR C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
LIMITS OF THE POSSIBLE 21 n.1 (1962) (“Any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic.”).  
 272. See Graff, supra note 270 (explaining how a changing world requires 
greater understanding of technology but how lawyers, who are not sufficiently 
trained in topics like coding, are troublingly deficient in this knowledge, leading 
to “bungle[d] lawsuits,” “stymie[d] criminal investigations,” and “misappl[ied] 
law”). 
 273. See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 1 (2009) (“The allure 
of science has always captivated members of the legal profession. Its siren’s song 
has followed us throughout much of American legal history.”). 
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suggested that science has become the God of the criminal justice 
system; judges and lawyers seem to venerate science more than 
anything else in the system.274  
Because lawyers generally trust the results of science and 
technology, and of criminal justice prediction and conviction 
programs in particular, defense lawyers often do not even consider 
challenging prosecutors’ reliance on these secret programs. There 
have been some pockets of litigation related to the secrecy of these 
algorithms and source codes—such as with breathalyzers and 
PGSs275—but not enough. Perhaps such challenges have been 
stifled by the routine lack of success that challengers experience.276  
V. A Problem of Constitutional Proportions 
The secrecy of the algorithms and source codes underlying 
today’s many conviction programs should spark concern. The 
dangers of this secrecy go beyond the criticisms levied against the 
secrecy shrouding the details of the prediction programs used in 
setting bail, sentencing, and making parole decisions.277 Those 
criticisms have generally focused on the programs’ reliance on 
legally questionable and morally repugnant factors that 
discriminate against minorities, and they have lightly touched on 
the issues of accuracy and reliability as well.278 With respect to 
conviction programs, concerns about accuracy and reliability take 
center stage, as false positives in this area could amount to fining, 
incarcerating, or even killing innocent people.279 Of course 
concerns about relying on race and its proxies, or other 
unacceptable factors, remain troubling, but accuracy and 
reliability are paramount here. And one cannot satisfactorily 
determine accuracy and reliability when secrecy cloaks the 
algorithms and source codes underlying these conviction 
                                                                                                     
 274.  See id. at 119 (“Perhaps the greatest irony . . . is the place of honor and 
worship to which science has ascended.”). 
 275. See supra Parts IV.A.1, 3. 
 276. See supra Parts IV.A.1, 3. 
 277. See supra Part II.   
 278. See supra Part II.D.  
 279.  See supra notes 154–156 and accompanying text. 
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programs. However, in many cases, for-profit companies have 
created the programs prosecutors regularly employ.280 It is not 
surprising, then, that these companies want to maintain the 
secrecy surrounding their products so that they may continue to 
earn profits off of them. While this makes sense from the 
company’s perspective, it creates problems when prosecutors use 
these programs within the criminal justice system. If the programs 
remain secret, how can researchers or defendants independently 
test them for consistency and accuracy? If judges, prosecutors, or 
the companies themselves refuse to lift the veil of secrecy, how can 
defendants effectively challenge these programs, which may very 
well be the basis not just for a defendant’s denial of bail, long 
sentence, or denial of parole, but for the defendant’s conviction? 
Although defendants generally have access to the results of their 
computer-based assessments, the details of the algorithm and 
underlying source code that computed it are generally withheld.281 
This secrecy poses a problem under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution, which provide that criminal 
defendants are entitled to due process of law prior to conviction 
and punishment.282 Defendants’ due process rights are in some 
regards quite broad, but defining the scope of these rights is 
sometimes difficult and requires a bit of interpretation.283 In 
various areas of due process jurisprudence, courts have applied 
slightly different tests to determine whether there has been a due 
process violation. For example, in determining whether the 
prosecution has unfairly withheld exculpatory information, a court 
                                                                                                     
 280.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 281.  See Angwin et al., supra note 42; see also supra Part III (describing 
various conviction algorithms and touching on the secrecy enveloping these 
various cocoons surrounding the technologies employed to secure convictions).  
 282.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No 
State . . . shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”). 
 283.  See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 14 (2006) (explaining that “[t]he body of criminal due process 
precedents is highly protective of defendants in many regards” but that, “[a]t the 
same time, due process hearing rights that are routine in the pretrial stages of 
civil cases can be absent from parallel stages of the criminal process, despite the 
comparable or greater interests at stake”). 
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assesses whether the withheld information was  
material—whether there is a reasonable probability that 
disclosing it would have made a difference in the outcome at 
trial.284 In the context of pre-trial publicity, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that a defendant’s due process rights have been 
violated if a media circus may have, or actually did, infect the jury 
in the charging venue.285 Common to the Court’s due process cases 
in the criminal justice arena, though, is reliance on several values 
supported by this constitutional right.286 The various 
constitutional values embedded in and at the core of the Court’s 
due process cases include “adversarial testing, truth-finding, 
                                                                                                     
 284. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality opinion) 
(“The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now 
hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt 
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
 285.  See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 398–99 (2010) (stating that 
“[j]urors . . . need not enter the box with empty heads in order to determine the 
facts impartially,” explaining that “[i]t is sufficient if the jurors can lay aside their 
impressions or opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in 
court,” and concluding that “Skilling failed to establish that a presumption of 
prejudice arose or that actual bias infected the jury that tried him” (internal 
quotations and alterations omitted)); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 
(1966) (“The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided since the 
courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the 
court. . . . [T]he presence of the press at judicial proceedings must be limited when 
it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged.”); 
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (“[I]t was a denial of due 
process . . . to refuse the request for a change of venue, after the people of 
Calcasieu Parish had been exposed repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of 
Rideau personally confessing in detail to the crimes with which he was later to be 
charged.”); see also Jordan Gross, If Skilling Can’t Get a Change of Venue, Who 
Can? Salvaging Common Law Implied Bias Principles from the Wreckage of the 
Constitutional Pretrial Publicity Standard, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 575, 582–615 (2013) 
(chronicling the evolution of the Court’s pretrial publicity jurisprudence). 
 286. See Ryan, supra note 145, at 421 (“Beyond the constitutional provisions 
themselves, though, the Court regularly relies on at least four important 
constitutional criminal procedural values. These are the values of adversarial 
testing, truth-finding, dignity, and equality.”). 
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dignity, and equality.”287 Each of these values is important to 
preserving criminal defendants’ due process rights.288    
This constitutional right of due process encompasses a number 
of more specific rights, including the right to a fair trial, the right 
to be provided with exculpatory evidence known by the 
government, the right to present a defense, and the right to have 
access to resources to make out a defense.289 In its 1973 case of 
Chambers v. Mississippi,290 the Court explained that “[t]he right of 
an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right 
to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.”291 
In Chambers, this meant that the state’s evidentiary rules 
preventing the defendant from admitting into evidence the many 
confessions to the crime made by another individual 
unconstitutionally deprived the defendant of his due process 
rights.292 More recently, in its 2006 case of Holmes v. South 
Carolina,293 the Court reiterated the principle espoused in 
Chambers, stating that “the Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 
defense.’”294 There, the Court held that the defendant’s due process 
rights were violated when the state court refused to admit evidence 
that another individual confessed to the crime because, according 
to the state court, this evidence failed to “raise[] a reasonable 
                                                                                                     
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id.  
 289. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76, 86–87 (1985) (explaining that 
the Due Process Clause requires courts to “take steps to assure that the defendant 
has a fair opportunity to present his defense,” which in this case meant providing 
the defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist); see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257, 273 (1948) (stating that “a person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to his day in 
court—are basic in our system of jurisprudence” and that “these rights include, 
as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, 
and to be represented by counsel”). 
 290.  410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
 291. Id. at 294. 
 292.  See id. at 302 (“We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence, 
coupled with the State’s refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine [the 
confessor], denied him a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental 
standards of due process.”).  
 293.  547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
 294.  Id. at 324 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)). 
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inference as to the defendant’s own innocence”295 and instead 
“merely cast[] a bare suspicion or raise[d] a conjectural inference 
as to another’s guilt.”296 Invoking the constitutional right to 
present one’s defense under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme 
Court explained that, while states “have broad latitude . . . to 
establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials, . . . the 
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense,’”297 which limits states’ 
rulemaking powers.298  When a state promulgates rules that 
“infringe upon [this] weighty interest of the accused,”299 it risks 
depriving the defendant of this important right.300 
The Court has even extended this right to present a defense to 
include providing indigent defendants with the resources to do so. 
In Ake v. Oklahoma,301 the Court explained that the “due process 
guarantee of fundamental fairness . . . derives from the belief that 
justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a 
defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in 
a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.”302 
Accordingly, if a defendant cannot afford the tools necessary to 
meaningfully present his defense, the government “must take 
steps to assure that [he] has a fair opportunity” to do so.”303 The 
Court has applied this principle to provide defendants with copies 
of their district court transcripts,304 waive the fee to file for 
                                                                                                     
 295. Id. at 323. 
 296. Id. at 323–24. 
 297. Id. at 324. 
 298. See id. (stating that states’ latitude “to establish rules excluding evidence 
from criminal trials . . . has limits”). 
 299. Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324. 
 300. Id.  
 301. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
 302.  Id. at 76. 
 303.  Id. 
 304.  See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 
470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985) (relying on the Griffin case as partial precedent for the 
decision). 
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appeal,305 provide defendants with effective assistance of 
counsel,306 and the assistance of a psychiatrist.307 
The constitutional right to be provided the opportunity to 
present a complete defense is closely related to the Confrontation 
Clause right firmly embedded in the Sixth Amendment308 and 
recently expounded on by the Court in Crawford v. Washington309 
and its progeny. In Crawford, the Court clarified that the 
Confrontation Clause requires that out-of-court statements that 
are testimonial in nature be inadmissible at trial unless “the 
declarant was unavailable to testify . . . and the defendant had had 
a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”310 In Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts311 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico,312 the Court built 
on this groundbreaking case to establish that, even when a party 
presents forensic testimony at trial, the author of the relevant 
forensic report must also testify at trial.313 Referencing these same 
                                                                                                     
 305.  See Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959); see also Ake, 470 U.S. at 76 
(relying on Burns as partial precedent for the decision). 
 306.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1963); see also Ake, 470 U.S. at 76 (relying on 
Burns as partial precedent for the decision). 
 307.  See Ake, 470 U.S. at 86–87 (“We therefore conclude that Ake also was 
entitled to the assistance of a psychiatrist on this issue and that the denial of that 
assistance deprived him of due process.”).  
 308.  The Sixth Amendment provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 309.  541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 310.  Id. at 53–54, 68. The Court also noted that this rule “does not bar the use 
of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the 
matter asserted . . . .” Id. at 59 n.9; see also Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) 
(plurality opinion) (stating that “Crawford . . . took pains to reaffirm the 
proposition that the Confrontation Clause ‘does not bar the use of testimonial 
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter 
asserted”’). 
 311.  557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 312.  564 U.S. 647 (2011). 
 313. See id. at 651–52 (concluding that live testimony of a forensic analyst 
who did not perform the relevant forensic testing was insufficient to meet the 
requirements of the Confrontation Clause); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307, 329 
(holding that “affidavits reporting the results of forensic analysis which shows 
that material seized by the police and connected to the defendant was cocaine” 
constituted testimonial statements, which rendered them inadmissible under the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and Crawford because the declarant was 
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ideas, the Holmes Court314 noted that the right to have a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense could be 
rooted in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment in 
addition to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clauses.315 In fact, even in Chambers—which the Court decided 
long before the Crawford case—the Court found that “[t]he rights 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in 
one’s own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due 
process.”316 
Defendants’ inabilities to gain access to information that may 
be essential to presenting a complete defense thus poses a 
significant constitutional concern under both the Due Process 
Clauses and the Confrontation Clause. Pursuant to the Due 
Process Clauses, greater information about the algorithms and 
source codes underlying the computer programs generating 
breathalyzer, fingerprint, and DNA evidence against criminal 
defendants could very well be crucial to these defendants’ defenses. 
Without access to this information, criminal defendants are denied 
the “fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations” to 
                                                                                                     
not unavailable and the defense had not had the opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant). The Court muddied the waters somewhat when it determined in 
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012), that there was no Confrontation Clause 
defect when the prosecution’s expert relied on the report of an outside 
laboratory—a report that developed a DNA profile of a rapist from the victim’s 
vaginal swabs—to conclude that the defendant’s DNA profile matched the DNA 
profile developed by the outside laboratory. See generally Williams v. Illinois, 567 
U.S. 50 (2012). Although five Justices voted in favor of not finding a Confrontation 
Clause problem, they could not agree on the reasoning. As Justice Kagan 
explained in dissent, the Williams case “left significant confusion in [its] wake.” 
Id. at 141. It now seems that Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming “no longer mean all 
that they say,” but “no one can tell in what way or to what extent they are altered 
because no proposed limitation commands the support of a majority.” Id. Justice 
Kagan (along with Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor) thus concluded 
that, “until a majority of th[e] Court reverses or confines those decisions, [one 
should] understand them as continuing to govern, in every particular, the 
admission of forensic evidence.” Id. 
 314. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
 315.  See id. at 324 (“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses 
of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” (quoting Crane v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986))). 
 316. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). 
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which Chambers and Holmes held they are entitled.”317 At the 
same time, withholding this information about the underlying 
algorithms and computer source codes violates the related 
Confrontation Clause.318 The State is presenting testimonial 
information—whether that be in the form of breathalyzer, 
fingerprint, DNA, or other evidence—against the defendant 
without allowing the defendant to truly confront the witnesses 
against him as the Sixth Amendment requires.319 The forensic 
examiner in these cases is not the true witness, or at least not the 
only witness, against the defendant. Instead, the forensic 
examiner is relying heavily on the conviction program’s underlying 
algorithm and source code in concluding that the defendant’s blood 
or breath alcohol content is at a particular level, that his 
fingerprint is a match to the one left on the murder weapon, or that 
his DNA matches the DNA left at the crime scene.320 Often, the 
forensic examiner is not even entirely aware of how the algorithm 
and source code reach their results.321 Instead, the examiner may 
understand only how he must set up the test and how to interpret 
the results reached by the algorithm and source code embedded in 
the computer program. Cross-examination may thus reveal the 
examiner’s mistakes, incompetency, or even fraud,322 but the 
                                                                                                     
 317.  Id. at 294; see also Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324 (stating that “the 
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to 
present a complete defense.’” (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 
(1986))). 
 318.  Professor Andrea Roth has argued that “[a]llowing the state to build or 
harness machines to render accusations, without also providing the defendant a 
constitutional right to test the credibility of those machine sources, resembles 
trial by ex parte affidavit”—one of the primary concerns that animated the 
drafting and ratification of the Confrontation Clause. See Roth, supra note 113, 
at 2041, 2043. 
 319.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that, “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him”); see also supra notes 308–316 and accompanying text 
(explaining how the Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment in Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) and its progeny). Some scholars disagree, though, 
on whether machines, themselves, are “witnesses” under the language of the 
Sixth Amendment. See Roth, supra note 113, at 2040. 
 320.  See supra Parts III.A.1–2. 
 321.  See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.  
 322.  See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. 647, 661–62 (2011) (explaining that 
confrontation was necessary to “expose any lapses or lies on the certifying 
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examiner would not be able to sufficiently answer any questions 
the defense might pose related to how the conviction program 
reached its conclusions. And any answer the examiner might 
espouse would likely be based on training materials provided to 
him—statements provided by the creator of the test—which likely 
would not divulge details about the proprietary algorithm or source 
code. Such examiner statements would be insufficient to meet the 
requirements of the Sixth Amendment as explained by Crawford 
and its progeny.323   
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, requiring additional expert testimony on the part of 
the prosecution could pose practical problems. In those cases, the 
Court was addressing the prosecution’s concerns that requiring 
forensic examiners to testify to the results of drug analyses and 
blood tests would be overly burdensome.324 The Court, however, 
explained that constitutional requirements like those imposed by 
the Confrontation Clause “may not disregard [such constitutional 
provisions] at our convenience,”325 and only a small percentage of 
cases proceed to trial anyway, significantly reducing the burden 
alleged by the prosecution.326 Attempting to mitigate such possible 
                                                                                                     
analyst’s part”); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009) 
(“Confrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the 
incompetent one as well. Serious deficiencies have been found in the forensic 
evidence used in criminal trials.”). 
 323. The prosecution could potentially circumvent the Confrontation Clause 
requirements by calling an expert to testify about a matter and, in doing so, 
relying on and referring to a secret conviction program’s output. See generally 
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (plurality opinion) (finding no 
constitutional defect in a similar circumstance). In Williams v. Illinois, the Court 
found no violation of the Confrontation Clause in a similar situation, either 
because the expert’s reference to the underlying report was not offered to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted, or because the reference, had it been admitted 
for that purpose, was not testimonial in nature. See id. at 57–59. A majority of 
the Justices could not agree on the reasoning for the decision, leaving the 
precedential value of the case unclear. See id. at 141 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 324. See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 665; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325. 
 325. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325; see Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 665 (quoting 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325). 
 326. See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 667; see also Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325. 
Further, the Court stated that “[p]erhaps the best indication that the sky will not 
fall [when enforcing the Confrontation Clause] . . . is that it has not done so 
already. Many States have already adopted the constitutional 
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inconveniences in the evidentiary context, a number of states have 
addressed the issue of the accuracy and reliability of conviction 
program software and outputs through statutes and rules 
concluding that particular tools, and their underlying source codes 
and algorithms, are admissible at trial without a predicate 
showing of their validity in each case.327 In Underdahl, for 
example, a relevant state statute provided that “the results of a 
breath test, when performed by a person who has been fully 
trained in the use of an . . . approved breath-testing 
instrument, . . . are admissible in evidence without antecedent 
expert testimony that . . . [the] instrument provides a trustworthy 
and reliable measure of the alcohol in the breath.”328 And pursuant 
to a state rule, the relevant breathalyzer was approved for use 
statewide.329 State procedures authorizing particular instruments, 
though, are far from transparent, and, as the litigation related to 
the Underdahl case demonstrates, states have approved 
instruments that do indeed produce inaccurate results, at least in 
some circumstances.330 Further, prior authorization via statute or 
rule does not resolve the Confrontation Clause matter. A defendant 
is still being tried based on secret algorithms and source codes, and 
he is not being given the opportunity to ask questions and receive 
answers from individuals who have knowledge about this secret 
material; he thus lacks an opportunity to sufficiently confront 
witnesses against him and defend against this inculpatory 
evidence. As Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming made clear, whether 
compliance with the constitutional requirements creates burdens 
for the state does not justify disregarding the constitutional rules. 
                                                                                                     
rule . . . announce[d]” in Melendez-Diaz. Melendez Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325.  
 327. See Imwinkelried, supra note 178, at 112 (explaining that, “[u]nless the 
court invalidates the statute on some constitutional ground, the[se] statute[s] 
eliminate[] the need for the prosecution to present any foundational testimony 
about the empirical validity of the technique”). 
 328. MINN. STAT. § 634.16. 
 329. See Minn. R. 7502.0420, subpart 3 (repealed). 
 330. See In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 
816 N.W.2d 525, 536 (Minn. 2012) (referencing “[t]he district court[’s] 
determin[ation] . . . that the source code of the instrument did impact the 
reliability of Intoxilyzer 5000EN instruments that reported a ‘deficient sample’ 
while running the 240 software”). 
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In addition to the primary concerns related to a defendant’s 
opportunity to make a complete defense and to confront witnesses 
against him, the secrecy surrounding today’s secret conviction 
programs raises some questions under the doctrine flowing from 
the Supreme Court’s case of Brady v. Maryland331 and the 
disclosure obligations under various jurisdictions’ discovery rules. 
Brady and its progeny provide that a defendant’s due process 
rights are violated if the prosecution withholds exculpatory or 
impeachment evidence favorable to the accused if that evidence 
was material—if “its suppression undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the trial.”332 Beyond just the relevant exculpatory 
material within its own possession or knowledge, though, the 
prosecution is charged with disclosing exculpatory material within 
the knowledge of agents acting on its behalf, such as police officers 
and forensic examiners.333 Translating this doctrine to the 
employment of PGSs in criminal cases illustrates the difficulties 
that these conviction programs create. If a PGS acts on behalf of 
the prosecution in analyzing a DNA mixture to determine the 
relative likelihoods that the defendant was a contributor to the 
                                                                                                     
 331.  373 U.S. 83 (1963).   
 332.  See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674–78 (1985) (“Consistent 
with ‘our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt,’ a 
constitutional error occurs, and the conviction must be reversed, only if the 
evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in 
the outcome of the trial.”); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“We now hold that the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
 333.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)  
[T]he prosecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed, must be 
assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of 
all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of “reasonable 
probability” is reached. This in turn means that the individual 
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the 
others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the 
police.  
See also John v. People, S. Ct. Crim. No. 2014-0030, 2015 WL 5622212, at *5 (V.I. 
Sept. 24, 2015) (“The prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of all relevant 
and material information within the actual knowledge and possession of other 
agencies outside of the prosecutor’s office where these agencies have collaborated 
with the prosecution as . . . part of the investigative team, such as the police 
department or forensic lab.”). 
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sample versus another individual, then the prosecution should be 
charged with the potentially exculpatory and impeachment 
evidence buried in the PGS’s algorithms and source codes. But 
without transparency between at least the PGS developer and the 
prosecution, the prosecutor is not in a position to fulfill his 
constitutional and ethical duties with respect to disclosure. Where 
state discovery rules require the prosecution to maintain an open 
file,334 similar logic indicates that the prosecution should provide 
the accused with information on the conviction programs’ 
algorithms and source codes. 
Ultimately, defendants’ due process and confrontation rights 
suggest that the algorithms and source codes underlying secret 
conviction programs should be disclosed. It is only with access to 
this information that defendants and their counsel and experts can 
examine whether the evidence used against them is valid. There 
are a variety of ways by which transparency could be achieved, and 
it would not necessarily have to jeopardize the business interests 
of the companies producing these important technologies.335 
Indeed, the government could provide this information under seal 
or pursuant to a protective order;336 or, perhaps more 
appropriately, the companies could include the value of disclosure 
in their bargains with the government to use the programs or use 
                                                                                                     
 334.  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903 (“Upon motion of the defendant, 
the court must order . . . [t]he State to make available to the defendant the 
complete files of all law enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and 
prosecutors’ offices involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the 
prosecution of the defendant.”); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 39.14  
Subject to [certain] restrictions . . . as soon as practicable after 
receiving a timely request from the defendant the state shall produce 
and permit the inspection of any . . . documents . . . that constitute or 
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and that 
are in the possession, custody, or control of the state or any person 
under contract with the state. 
 335. In fact, as Professor Edward Imwinkelried has explained, a company’s 
exposure risk for the wrongful disclosure of a trade secret is small in the context 
of disclosure pursuant to a criminal prosecution. See Imwinkelried, supra note 
178, at 127–28. The risk is much higher when a company is ordered to disclose a 
trade secret to its competitors—those “with economic interests directly adverse to 
those of the owner of the trade secret.” Id. at 128. 
 336. For a discussion of how parties have disclosed trade secrets pursuant to 
protective orders and other protective measures in different types of cases, see id. 
at 125–28. 
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the resulting analyses in court. The government could perhaps pay 
a premium for an exclusive license to the software. Whatever the 
method, only greater transparency can satisfy defendants’ 
constitutional guarantees. 
A courtroom may not be the best crucible in which to 
determine the accuracy and reliability of these types of technology. 
Experts, rather than lay judges and jurors, could very likely reach 
more reliable conclusions on this subject of accuracy. And defense 
lawyers would most certainly welcome peer review of the various 
conviction programs. But, while accuracy and reliability are crucial 
here, they are not the only priority. Rather, the constitutional 
rights of individual defendants are equally, if not more, 
important.337 And courtrooms are the proper venues for jealously 
guarding these rights. While truth-finding has increasingly 
become the predominant value in discussions across the criminal 
justice system, we should not let this goal blind us from other 
important interests. As William Blackstone once said, it is “better 
that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”338 
Even in the world of high-powered DNA analysis, absolute 
certainty of truth—and thus absolute certainty of whether a 
defendant is guilty—is generally unobtainable.339 We can achieve 
probabilities and likelihoods, but absolute certainty is difficult.340 
In wading into the statistics involved in determining the likelihood 
of a defendant’s guilt, it is important to safeguard the principle 
that the risk of wrongful conviction should weigh heavier than the 
risk of wrongful exoneration. 
                                                                                                     
 337.  See Ryan, supra note 145, at 433 (“[T]here are values beyond just 
truth-finding that should not be forgotten. Just like we sacrifice truth for the sake 
of privacy when a judge excludes probative evidence that was found in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, values such as dignity remain important even aside 
from their relationship to truth.”); see also supra notes 286–288 and 
accompanying text (explaining that the constitutional values of “adversarial 
testing, truth-finding, dignity, and equality” are “embedded in and at the core of 
the Court’s due process cases”). 
 338.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352; see also Alexander Volokh, 
N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997) (exploring the “Blackstone ratio” of 
ten to one). 
 339.  See Ryan, supra note 145, at 429 (“Despite our advances in science and 
technology, truth may be difficult to come by. And certainty of truth is generally 
impossible.”). 
 340.  See id. at 429.  
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VI. Conclusion 
Commentators have paid significant attention to the 
algorithms, and maybe even the source codes, underlying 
computerized prediction programs that judges and parole boards 
have used to aid in setting bail, sentencing, and determining 
whether to release offenders from prison. These programs deserve 
this attention because they are potentially based on illegal or 
morally repugnant discriminators like race and because there are 
real, and often overlooked, questions about the accuracy and 
reliability of these programs. But even more concerning are the 
secret conviction programs that prosecutors are quietly using to 
secure convictions in criminal cases. Judges, prosecutors, and the 
businesses that developed these programs have generally refused 
to disclose the details of the algorithms and source codes powering 
these conviction programs, and this secrecy raises real 
constitutional concerns. Defendants’ due process and confrontation 
rights entitle them to have meaningful opportunities to present 
full defenses and to confront the witnesses against them. But, 
without transparency of the algorithms and source codes 
embedded in the conviction programs, defendants cannot truly 
probe the evidence presented against them. They lack the 
opportunity to investigate whether the algorithms are sound, the 
source codes are error-free, and the programs produce accurate 
and reliable results. They also lack the opportunity to 
cross-examine individuals who truly know the inner workings of 
the programs to again determine accuracy and reliability. 
Transparency is thus necessary to protect these defendants’ 
constitutional rights. 
 
 
 
